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THE NATIONS TO SPEAK FOR THEMSELVES

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EUROPE UP AGAINST IT

by VERNON BARTLETT

SCIENTISTS are always making discoveries about the adaptability—one might almost say the common sense—of the lower animals and I read somewhere the other day that even a worm may be taught to turn right or left at will. Only the poor, well-meaning, muddle-headed human being goes on his way learning nothing and forgetting a great deal. The crisis which Herr Hitler brought to a head by his speech of March 7 has many lessons which ought to be learnt but which will probably pass unnoticed, for hysteria does not encourage calm reflection. But it may not be a waste of time and space to call attention to a few of them, for it is, alas, certain that they must be learnt if ever we are to improve on the present armistice which men pathetically call peace.

First, a paragraph of consolation. We are all shocked, and rightly shocked, by the *Führer's* methods of facing us with *faits accomplis*. It is uncomfortable and impolite, and, worse still, it does spread a genuine doubt as to whether his word may ever be trusted. But we seldom get reform or progress unless somebody throws stones about. Conscience and brotherly love are not yet so developed that they compel the rich to distribute their wealth to the poor. Fear of the mob is still a potent instrument of reform. Women might still be clamouring for votes if they had not poured acid into letter boxes and disturbed Mr. Lloyd George at his golf, and, *mirabile dictu*, M. Flandin, in his desire to win Italian support against Germany, has recently been hinting at the value of Article Nineteen of the League Covenant—the article which advocates the change of treaties that have become out-of-date. In other words, until we have attained that wisdom which enables us to initiate reforms before we are driven to them by fear, we cannot grumble too much about

the impatience of the masses, the suffragettes or the Nazis. They are not necessarily so dangerous as they sound.

There is a second and far more important lesson. These people are dangerous in proportion to the injustices they resent. On every occasion since the Peace Conference on which Germany has torn up a page or two of the treaty, her justification for doing so has been sufficient to make any protest against her manners ineffective and a little insincere. One need not go back to the past. The present case is as good an illustration as one could wish to find, or rather, to avoid. To many people in Great Britain the Locarno treaty was a more important document than the League Covenant. Being limited to an area so near home it had more meaning. But it contained that one inequality. It prohibited Germany from fortifying her frontier while it allowed France to fortify hers. Such a state of affairs was unjust and could not last. Nobody had the courage to abolish it until Herr Hitler himself decided to do so in circumstances designed to fill his adopted countrymen with admiration and their neighbours with alarm.

There have been other examples in the long story of Germany's recovery of equality which are extremely depressing in that they encourage belief in the fist-on-the-table method. But they may also be useful since they show so clearly that a successful foreign policy can only be based upon principles. The opportunism which led France to go slow on sanctions against Italy has tremendously weakened her case for sanctions against Germany. Had M. Laval cared two hoots about the Covenant when Italy attacked Abyssinia, either Germany would never have dared to send her troops to occupy her own demilitarised territory, or Great Britain would have been quite as determined as France to lose no time in checking methods which so obviously endangered the collective system. The inequality would have been removed to everybody's satisfaction as part of a general settlement at a new peace conference. In other words, principles pay. Opportunism might be defined as that timidity which leads men to miss opportunities.

* * *

There is a third lesson, which is the danger of under-estimating the pernicious influence of the Old School Tie. Years ago, in some League committee, a delegate paid a tribute to the great work of Dr. Nansen in favour of refugees. Another delegate followed him, then another,

another and another, until an entire day had been wasted. The next morning the *corvée* continued, and there was so much comment at the end of it all because only one delegate had remained silent that he felt compelled to rise to his feet to explain how his country fully shared the general admiration for the Norwegian explorer, but how he had not wanted to take up the time of the committee, and so on, until a second day had been lost on compliments to a man who was far too great to need them.

This sort of thing is all very well in peace time, although the ordeal of listening to flattery in two languages must have cooled the ardour of thousands of League supporters. But it is dangerous—even disastrous —when some government has, in the terms of the Covenant, " committed an act of war against all the other members of the League." Nothing so helped the Italian cause in Geneva and so endangered the collective system when it had to be applied against Germany as the fact that Baron Aloisi, the chief Italian delegate, is a charming and amiable gentleman to whom nobody is willingly rude.

But while politenesses were interchanged in the League Council room and delegate after delegate assured the Italians of his friendly feelings while he voted sanctions against them, men, women and children were being bombed to death in Abyssinia. This miserable dispute in East Africa should have convinced everyone of the folly of trying to combine the enforcement of new laws of international conduct with the maintenance of cordial relations with the criminal who breaks them. As one observer put it, " You can't stretch out one hand in friendship to the Italians and kick them behind with the other." You can't physically or grammatically, but apparently you can politically.

* * *

The last thing this article is intended to do is to urge any feeling of hostility towards individuals from aggressor States. As I have urged before, there should be no more bitterness against an Italian than there is in the minds of members of a jury against the prisoner upon whom they have to pass their verdict. One would rather see the League collapse altogether than have it used as a cloak for all the mean and personal little spitefulnesses which people claim are patriotic in war time. Has the *Daily Mail*, for example, forgotten how it made a virtue twenty years ago of hounding into concentration camps every little nonentity who hap-

pened to have a German name ? Sanctions based on envy, anger, fear or even dislike of some particular form of government are worse than useless, for there is no respect for justice in them.

But the basis of this " collective system " of which we talk so much is quite clear. It is respect for a new code of law contained in the Covenant of the League. And that Covenant declares that, if any country resorts to war in disregard of the Covenant, all other members of the League " undertake immediately to subject it to the severance of all trade or financial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse between their nationals and the nationals of the Covenant-breaking State, and the prevention of all financial, commercial or personal intercourse between the nationals of the Covenant-breaking State and the nationals of any other State, whether a member of the League or not."

Nobody could pretend that the hesitating sanctions which have been imposed upon Italy bear a very close resemblance to these categorical orders. Italy was not turned out of the League ; instead, she put other member States in a panic by threatening to leave of her own accord. Each time it really seemed probable that all relations would be broken off, the Duce only needed to whisper that he would treat such a breach as an unfriendly act, and a dozen delegates urged that to enforce the League Covenant would lead to a world war. The " *Journal de Genève*," which used to be one of the most important newspapers on the Continent, recently printed an enthusiastic article which declared : " Franco-Italian relations are excellent . . . French policy is once again combining respect for the Covenant with fidelity to her friends." And nobody found anything illogical or immoral in such statements.

Why ? Because Italy is a great power with ambitions which coincide to some extent with those of France. Because Great Britain and France at different times have talked over with Italy the possibility of dividing up Abyssinia to their own advantage. Because Mr. Eden or M. Flandin likes the company of Baron Aloisi at dinner. Because we can't be rude to somebody who wears the Old School Tie.

* * *

Consider this business of loyalties on another plane, and you will realise why sanctions have worked badly, and must always work badly until we alter our whole conception of international relations, until we really do treat war and the preparation for it as a crime. What should we

say of a magistrate who argued that, although his prisoner had quite deliberately broken the law after receiving several warnings from the police, no sentence would be passed because the man on the bench and the man in the dock were old friends? One of the tests of a civilised people is its ability to subordinate personal feelings and inclinations to its social duties. Only in such countries is the law free from corruption. Only in such an international society would man be free from the fear of war.

* * *

Such are the exigencies of monthly journalism, this article has had to be composed in the very middle of the worst international crisis since the war. By the time it appears in print, either Herr Hitler may have had to humiliate himself to an extent which will be very damaging even to a god-like dictator who has absolute control over the written and loud-spoken word in his country. Or he may have become involved in some very desperate action, the consequences of which cannot be foreseen. But in either case there will be remarkable proof that an international conscience has become an important factor in international politics.

Six months ago almost every government in the world combined to show Signor Mussolini that he could not start a war and get off scot free. Nations with no quarrel against Italy nevertheless took action against her because they realised for the first time that the enemy of one of their number had automatically become the enemy of them all. And the Duce's prestige has suffered in consequence as at no other time since his October Revolution in 1922.

Now Herr Hitler, has tried similar methods and has met with similar dangers. Nine Englishmen out of ten sympathised with his resentment against a treaty which limited German freedom to fortify German territory. Had Signor Mussolini appealed to the League against the misdeeds of the Abyssinians he would have received considerable support, for nobody loves the Negus. Had Herr Hitler appealed against the unfairness of unilateral demilitarisation he would have received still more backing, for the existence of this inequality was bound sooner or later to poison what remained of the famous atmosphere of Locarno, and already the British and other governments were working to remove it.

But the decision to send troops first in the hope of negotiating later was a step which has compelled thousands of Englishmen to sub-

ordinate equity to law. Many people in many countries had to support their governments last autumn in voting sanctions directed against Italy. The hesitation of France to drop her ally in order to live up to that clear obligation lessened international respect for her as perhaps nothing has done since the French government ordered the occupation of the Ruhr—a stupidity which made the growth of violent nationalism in Germany so inevitable that a well-known Frenchman recently referred to Poincaré as Hitler's father.

Great Britain has based her policy on the collective system. So Mr. Eden has said, and I, for one, believe him. But rightly or wrongly, the world was not yet entirely convinced. Germany's occupation of her own territory was in itself nothing like so serious a transgression as Italy's occupation of somebody's else. It went against British sense of equity—more commonly known as "fair play"—that the crimes should be put on the same footing, and that, in consequence, there should be the least delay in beginning negotiations on the peace proposals with which Herr Hitler accompanied his war-like step. Nevertheless, the law—the Locarno treaty—was clear, and the rest of the world chose the German case rather than the Italian one as the test of the collective system. Mr. Eden has, in consequence, risked personal unpopularity at home when he could so easily have been loudly acclaimed—but lamentably unconstructive.

The extent to which, in these grave weeks of crisis, people have subordinated their own sympathies to the law is a remarkable and encouraging proof that men may yet equal the animals in their adaptability to changing circumstances. Great is the law and it shall prevail.

SYMBOLICAL?

I sent yesterday to the Stationery Office for a copy of the Locarno Treaty. The reply came back that it was out of print.—*Peterborough, "Daily Telegraph."*

OUR SUCCESSFUL START

We apologise to any of our readers who may have experienced difficulty in obtaining copies of the first issue of "World Review of Reviews," owing to a shortage of supplies. So great was the demand that we sold out of our entire 20,000 *copies within a week of publication, and were unable at once to supply in full the numerous repeat orders which we received from the newsagents and booksellers.*

THE OPEN FORUM

ENMITY WITHOUT END?

by BERTRAND DE JOUVENEL

¶ *In this section we publish articles by men of international fame. We do not necessarily share their opinions, which we encourage them to state as frankly as they can. We are honoured this month by a contribution from a distinguished French journalist. M. de Jouvenel's recent interview with Herr Hitler was the immediate cause of a French request for further details of German proposals and the immediate prelude to the German denunciation of the Locarno Treaty. He here points out the futility of Franco-German rivalry*

THERE are two views of the Franco-German differences. Some people feel that the interests of the two countries must of necessity clash. Others hold the view that our disagreements and conflicts have been due solely to a series of unfortunate accidents.

Where might the fatal " clash of interests " between Germany and France occur ? Certainly not on the Rhine ; both countries are content with their frontiers. But possibly in Central Europe, where Germany feels that she should expand either commercially or territorially, and where France has committed herself to preserve the independence and integrity of the smaller nations. Central Europe is the only possible concrete reason for Franco-German conflicts. A French statesman who holds that view strenuously—Anatole de Monzie—has stated that it would be impossible to know who had won the Great War till the fate of Vienna was definitely settled.

Certainly the French people are not conscious of wrestling with Germany for the control of Central Europe. They have no desire to exert an influence over Austria or the Little Entente, no stake in the

continued existence of these countries. Their atittude towards Germany is dictated in no manner by such diplomatic considerations. They distrust the intentions of the German nation, and fear any increase in its power lest that power should some day be turned against them. What are the reasons for that distrust, which Mr. Baldwin alluded to in a pathetic speech before the House of Commons on March 9? They reach back, said the Prime Minister of England, to the days of Charlemagne! Well, not quite so far back, perhaps. It would be more accurate to say that France distrusts and fears Germany since that country has become numerically more powerful than herself. For centuries, France was the most highly-populated united nation on the Continent of Europe, and, being thus strong, she could afford to be confident. Shrewd German observers have repeatedly asserted that we should be a less suspicious people if we only had more children.

It has been the wonder of Europe that, during the fifteen years following our victory in the World War, we have not for one moment overcome our fears and suspicions of Germany. While Germany was disarmed, we dreamt of huge secret armies; while she was led by Social-Democrats, we attributed to these supine Liberals deeply-laid plans of aggression.

The attitude of France towards Germany, as long as we had the upper hand, might be qualified as inexcusable bullying, were it not for that fear and distrust which explain and excuse it.

"Keep Germany down"—such seemed to be our motto, and our British friends felt increasing indignation at this apparently unfair and ungenerous policy. Absurd demands in the matter of Reparations, the occupation of the Ruhr, lost us the friendship of a large percentage of the English nation. It should be explained that our claims were so extravagant, only because our rulers were thoroughly ignorant of economic laws. As for the occupation of the Ruhr, it followed upon the failure of Germany to fulfil promises which she had made under duress, and which we did not realise were impossible of execution.

It is a tragic irony of history, that when France found new statesmen, willing to sympathise with Germany's difficulties, in 1924, the nationalist revival in Germany was already well under way. Already we dealt no more with Social-Democratic Governments, but with Cabinets representing the big business interests. Those Cabinets over which Stresemann held undisputed sway were willing and eager to come to an under-

standing with France. Indeed, one cannot fail to remark how much better disposed towards France they were than the Thiers and MacMahon Governments had been towards Germany after 1871. Our failure to establish a definite friendship between the two nations at that time is one of the major tragedies of history. Goodwill was lacking on neither side, but there was a tacit agreement that progress should be made step by step, thus foregoing the advantages of a dramatic reconciliation and general settlement. Such a dramatic stroke might have greatly strengthened Stresemann's position and, coupled with economic advantages given to Germany, might have nipped in the bud the growth of the new nationalism. Unfortunately, at that time, we had not yet learnt from the Fascist leaders that the way of doing things matters far more to the crowds than the things done.

The years 1924-1929 were undoubtedly a period of progressive appeasement between the two countries. This was due of course in great measure to the fact that Germany was enabled, as an indirect consequence of Anglo-American loans, to fulfil some of her obligations in the matter of Reparations. It will be remembered that the year 1930 was a period of increasing economic difficulties for Germany, difficulties which culminated in the great financial crisis of June-July 1931. The days of poverty of 1923 had come back, and the German people, in desperation, turned to new leaders.

When Adolf Hitler became Chancellor, the parties of the Left who, in France, had constantly advocated a thorough reconciliation with Germany, suddenly shied away from the Third Reich. It was generally said at that moment that the " good " Germany had sunk and that the " bad " Germany had come to the surface once more. Those who had been against an understanding with Germany said that the event proved them right ; those who had been in favour said that this was the punishment for our reluctance to achieve a real *rapprochement.*

While they were thus quarrelling over the past, a completely unexpected phenomenon occurred : Hitler stated his will to establish a Franco-German friendship. He met with deep distrust, from some quarters because he was a German, from other quarters because he was a Fascist. Moreover, the wording of his pacific dispositions was unusual. We were used to the verbal finery of democratic Liberalism. Hitler's vocabulary was different, and those in France to whom it appealed were in a hopeless minority.

The reader may wonder why we leave out of this brief review every positive problem which arose between Germany and France during all those years. As a matter of fact, the struggle over Reparations, the squabble over the evacuation of the Rhineland, were important only because of their psychological implications. We did not vitally need the German money, and we certainly never had any intention of holding the Rhineland for all time. The clashes which occurred over these questions were merely occasions for the temperamental differences between the two nations to assert themselves.

When Hitler came into power, an era of German history was closed —that era, which had opened with the acceptance by the German Government, presided over by Max of Baden, of President Wilson's Fourteen Points. Or one might date the beginning of that era back to the day in 1917, when Erzberger got a majority in the Reichstag for his Peace Resolution. During fifteen years, the German people were fed on the Rousseau moral, and that common fodder established a community between them and the democracies of the West. With the advent of Hitler, however, a new "conception of the world" became the daily intellectual diet of the German people, and the advantages of international standards were lost.

The concrete problems arising between France and Germany had not become more acute. As a matter of fact, the most delicate of all Franco-German problems was soon solved by Herr Hitler: I am referring to the Polish Corridor, which France had undertaken to defend in case of conflict between Poland and Germany, and which appeared to a great part of French opinion as a perfectly outrageous imposition upon Germany. Herr Hitler, by signing a pact of non-aggression, forfeited for ten years any claim upon the Corridor. The restoration of German sovereignty upon the Saar was achieved without any opposition from France, nay, with French help. Thus, two of the most obvious causes of conflict disappeared. It may well be urged that, at the beginning of 1936, the reasons for a Franco-German war were far less numerous than at the beginning of 1933, when Hitler came into power.

The only disquieting factor was the enormous growth of German armaments. It is a failing of our all-too logical minds to presume that, when a nation spends over a billion pounds in three years on armaments, she intends to use these armaments (Mr. Winston Churchill's figure for the German military effort since Hitler's accession to power is a billion

and a half).

Mr. Baldwin regards the French Government of 1934, namely the Doumergue-Barthou Government, as partly responsible for the armaments race, since they refused an Anglo-German offer of limitation of armaments, by the famous note of the April 17, 1934. A wrong interpretation has been put by British opinion upon the French refusal. The French rulers were not anxious to preserve an ample margin of French superiority. They were simply distrustful of Germany. They thought: "When Germany was allowed an army of 100,000, she had in fact something like 300,000 men. If she is allowed 300,000, she will have 900,000."

The French statesmen of the pre-War generation, such as Poincaré, Doumergue and Barthou, have shown themselves untiring in their denunciations of German bad faith. It must be admitted that, in the era of the Weimar Republic, German statesmen were apt to make, in the matter of Reparations, promises they had no intention of keeping. However, they might be excused on the ground that these impossible obligations were forced upon them. The Hitler Government's breaches of faith are of a different kind. The German *Führer* alienated the most ardent French advocates of a *rapprochement* by his sudden decision, on March 16, 1935, to re-establish compulsory military service, without any warning. Then came, on March 7, 1936, the re-occupation of the Rhineland, equally without warning. Such gestures provide those who believe in an "eternally faithless Germany" with potent arguments. On the other hand, it may be said that Hitler was provoked to act in a brutal manner by France's reluctance to enter into negotiations with him.

Any discussion on the merits of French policy between 1918 and 1936 is now irrelevant and useless. It must be judged solely upon its results, namely the restoration of German power coupled by an intense feeling of grievance against France. Such are the fruits of a policy which never chose between the iron heel and the open hand.

The men who are responsible are dead or have retired. A new generation, in France, bears the burden of past errors. Young men who were playing football when it was decided to occupy the Ruhr may have to give their lives because, in those days, a seed was sown which has now borne its fruit.

We are faced with a situation which no amount of brooding over the past can redress. A strong warlike Germany confronts us, and, while her leader gives us assurances of goodwill, his deeds belie his words.

We are not incapable of admiring the patriotic faith which the German people put in their leader, and the brave confidence with which they launch themselves upon adventures which might have for them the most fearsome consequences. We have the greatest respect for that spirit of self-sacrifice for the common good which inflames the youth of Germany (though their conception of the common good does not always coincide with ours). The idea of a close friendship with that great nation appeals to us powerfully.

But no such friendship is possible if Herr Hitler's solicitude for "German honour" leads him to gestures which clash with our conception of honourable behaviour. There are details in the events of March 1935 and of March 1936, which are profoundly disquieting. For instance, the French veterans were invited in Berlin to be received by their ex-foes, and, if it had not been for an accident, they would have arrived on the very day when compulsory service was reestablished, so that their presence would have been represented as condoning the gesture of the German Government. To take another example, and a very recent one, when our Ambassador to Germany called on Herr Hitler on March 2, to affirm France's willingness to achieve a general settlement with Germany, he was told that he would, in a few days, receive a memorandum stating the German proposals. He did receive it.....a few hours after the German troops had marched into the Rhineland.

We are ready, willing, and eager to establish the closest and friendliest relationship with Germany. We regard it as essential to the preservation of peace and of the western civilisation. But we can feel at present no confidence in the German offers, and that is why, if we come to a general agreement with her, the great nations in whose word we have full confidence will have to act as guarantors of the German promises.

To be sure, it were far better to achieve a Franco-German friendship without any brokers, however honest! France may some day have leaders who, though they may have nothing else in common with Herr Hitler, will share his sense of drama, his knowledge of the means to fire the imagination of the crowds, and then we may have a striking scene of friendship such as those which Titus Livius delighted in describing. In the meantime, no more can be hoped for than an understanding, brought about and solidly guaranteed by friendly nations, in the forefront of which stands England.

THE NATIONS SPEAK FOR THEMSELVES

STORM OVER LOCARNO —

THE GREAT CHANCE

by RUDOLF KIRCHER

From the "Frankfurter Zeitung"

The "Frankfurter Zeitung" usually expresses through its editor, Herr Kircher, the most moderate of German Press views. The following appeared immediately after the announcement of the re-occupation of the Rhineland

WHY is it not possible to let every French citizen, peasant or labourer, and every English "man in the street" have the full text of Adolf Hitler's speech (not the more or less indifferent and hasty Press comments) in his own language? How is any co-operation among mankind possible without such information? The *true* nature and *true* aims of Hitler in the field of foreign politics were expressed with a clarity and openness which would be of the greatest significance were people really inclined to note them. The means he has used are bold, but have the unusual advantage of absolute openness and logic. We are experiencing a breaking down of the barriers to understanding—not by way of timid approaches, still less by way of a game of diplomatic hide and seek, but quite simply an attempt to shatter the dividing walls.

More than once we have said here: "An understanding with France is only possible after the worst crises." No one will doubt the seriousness of the crisis which has arisen through the march of German troops into the demilitarised zone. If it can be overcome, the door to agreements will be opened, the value of which (for all our neighbours) needs no elucidation. Then the wish of all those who want to see Germany take her place again in the League of Nations will be fulfilled. Serious steps

towards limitation of armaments can then be taken. Who cannot see that the Reich Government has accompanied a step which appears to so many as negative and provocative by much greater positive thoughts and binding proposals ?

If Germany had done nothing more than inform the Locarno Powers that the Franco-Soviet pact had in our opinion destroyed the Rhine pact, and that the Reich—in accordance with the declaration made by its Leader nearly a year ago—no longer felt itself bound by the latter—if Germany had done nothing more than present the Powers with the *fait accompli* of an occupation of the Rhineland, she would still have been acting within her rights and convictions ; but the international crisis would have been dangerously intensified. Adolf Hitler chose another way ; his plan is constructive ; he has covered the negative element with an absolutely unexpected wealth of positive elements. Let us be frank. Could even Mr. Eden a few days previously have dreamt that Germany would declare her readiness—her unconditional readiness—to return to Geneva ? True, for Sir Austen Chamberlain there could be no better Locarno than his own—but, would not a long-term pact of non-aggression freed from the proviso (untenable in the long run) of a one-sided demilitarised zone, be in fact more valuable, because more durable, than the old Locarno ? And would it not gain greatly in value if the guarantee of an Air Pact were added to it, a pact that would in practice prevent surprise attacks, and would at the same time automatically lead into the field of armament limitation ? For the proposed pacts in west and east (even including Lithuania !) were not the only essential points of the political conception offered to the world by Hitler ; he brought up once again the far-reaching ideas of disarmament contained in his speech of last year (the thirteen points).

New Life for the League

In other words, Germany accepts the existing collective system of her own free will, by announcing her return to the League of Nations. The Reich is, however, ready at the same time to add a fine net of effective regional security pacts to this system—*not* military alliances. The return of a Germany who many feared would rather blow up the League than rejoin it, gives that institution new life at a none too happy moment of its career—at the moment when a furthering weakening of the League is reckoned with on many sides through the withdrawal of Italy. We

believe we are not saying too much when we surmise that the settlement of the unhappy conflict over Abyssinia will be, to say the least, not made more difficult by Germany's policy.

As far as relations with Russia go, extraordinarily frank words have again been spoken. No one will expect after hearing them that the German Government will go beyond the limits of normal political and economic contact, arising out of common membership of the League.

Profit and Loss

We are betraying no secret if we say that the League and its politics had become so unpopular in Germany that the idea of re-entry was by no means a matter of course for many Germans. This newspaper is particularly gratified at the decision. We see in it not only the key to the European situation, but we are confident that the League—now that equality has been achieved—will be made capable of useful work through Germany's co-operation. It cannot but make a strong impression abroad that Germany, after her act of self-help, did not find it necessary to pose conditions of any kind. Neither the clearing of the colonial problem or the question of the reform of the League (separation from the Versailles Treaty) was made a condition. Supporters of the League abroad must welcome this with great relief. Finally, there is the renewed assurance that Germany has no territorial claims to make in Europe! With that every adherent of the much praised "collective system" can make a very considerable entry on the credit side of the balance sheet, France can even enter her Russian pact as a credit item, since it only destroyed the Locarno pact and not our readiness for collective co-operation.

The profit can therefore be great, very great, for all those of good will. And what might the loss be? There is no point in raising the slogan "treaty breaking," for it is certain that strife on this question would be useless. Neither Germany nor France can and will give up its standpoint on this matter. The decisive point is that everyone knew that Germany regarded this Russian pact as a breach of Locarno. Adolf Hitler made this plain ten months ago, and there has been no lack of warnings since. The consequences to the demilitarised zone have also been mentioned. France cannot bring up the argument that she is now no longer as safe as before. In whose hands are the immense lines of fortifications and innumerable batteries, which are capable of firing far

over the Rhine? Certainly, there is one item of loss. The concession of occupation of the demilitarised zone can no longer be used as a bargaining counter with Germany. That may be annoying for old-fashioned diplomats. They knew that this concession would soon have to be made, but had not reckoned with a one-sided solution. But is it not after all best that the German Government should now have cut the knot, as it is evident that whole governments in other countries totter when they are forced to make quite unavoidable and obvious concessions? Is not the gain on the whole matter far greater than the loss?

The question is and remains: Is the chance of a new peace to be seized now or not? We think it impossible that the peoples will allow their governments to reject Germany's outstretched hand, and to declare the inessential more important than the essential.

Honour and Freedom

From the "Hamburger Fremdenblatt"

To the mass of the German people the entry of German soldiers into the Rhineland was certainly symbolical and a matter of rejoicing. Here is a typical expression of the feeling. The action took place, it will be remembered, on Germany's "Heroes' Day"

NEVER have the dead heroes of a people been more worthily honoured than by the removal of the last fetters by which the blind hatred of the victors sought to humiliate a proud people for generations. German soldiers have again taken up the "Watch on the Rhine." And while the rejoicings resound in the Rhineland, the thoughts of millions will turn to those spots where German heroes lie. And though it may have seemed through evil years as though honour and freedom were no longer worth struggle and death, today all Germany knows that the spirit of the men who died for her is living still.

But those who followed the Leader's words with their hearts will have felt that a man spoke to the world who like no other statesman is seeking to serve the idea of peace and honourable co-operation. The German soldiers have not marched into the Rhineland as the advance guard of an army of revenge, but came in fulfilment of a historic mission. There can only be peace and friendship among equals. The French

people must win a better and more durable security than that given by concrete, barbed wire, poison gas and military alliances.

THE FRENCH VIEW

The Case for Sanctions

by PIERRE VIENOT

From "Lumière," Paris

The author of this article is a young French Deputy who for years strove to bring about an improvement between his country and Germany. The article was written before Herr Hitler's repudiation of the Locarno Treaty, and we give it as an indication that the demand for sanctions against Germany is not to be found on the lips only of rather hysterical Frenchmen with no real understanding of German character

For the past year students of German affairs have been asking where the Germans are going to begin, when their rearmament programme is finished. There is no doubt that they are going to make a "beginning" somewhere. The most difficult problem of our national life is to decide whether we shall resist that "beginning," and if so, how.

Everything goes to show that the offensive against the *status quo*, which National Socialist policy must lead us to expect, will not take the form of simple aggression against our territory. We shall not find ourselves faced with a declaration of war. There is no point in asking, as all French journalists do ask, whether Germany "wants war." We must ask what Germany *wants to get*, and to what degree she is ready to *risk* a war to get it.

The question that is uppermost is: Will rearmed Germany's first step lead her to repudiate the demilitarisation of the Rhine, or will it lead her into an offensive against Austria, and, necessarily therefore, against Czechoslovakia? Throughout the first two years of the Hitler regime the question of Austria loomed far larger in German policy than the question of the Rhine. It seemed that the *Anschluss* would be the first issue on which Germany would throw her new armies into the balance of European diplomacy. And indeed the first result that Germany, in view of the racial tendencies of National Socialism, must achieve is undoubtedly the incorporation of Austria into Germany.

LITVINOV OVER PARIS

The famous gargoyles of Notre Dame are in need of repair. It is said that the devil is in good condition. Only his face has changed a little.

"Brennessel," Munich

But, Hitler seems to regard the remilitarisation of the Rhine as the first essential. In this he is strongly influenced by the Reichswehr. He is weighing his chances for the future. His greatest chance lies in the attainment of his aims without war. A war in which he is sure to be victorious—*i.e.*, a localised war conducted against one opponent, whoever he may be, is an acceptable risk. A war against a coalition similar to that of twenty years ago is an unacceptable risk.

From that point of view, the *Anschluss* must appear even to Hitler a dangerous enterprise. Whatever precautions are taken to disguise military action as a police expedition in response to an appeal for help from inside Austria, there is always a danger that the disguise will be pierced. England appears to have decided on a policy of collective security which tolerates no sort of aggression. France, encouraged by English support, would go to the lengths of armed resistance. At one blow, the opposition of the Little Entente, negligible if isolated, would bring on a general war. Having weighed her chances in this

field, Germany is retreating, or rather, she is seeking guarantees first.

Hitler is trying to cover himself in the west by reoccupying the Rhine and building fortifications on the left bank comparable to the defences on France's eastern frontier. The feared Franco-British intervention must not be allowed to take on a pacific character, like the Ruhr expedition. England and France must know in advance that they risk war in its totality. As they are pacific nations, Hitler counts on their recoiling from such a possibility. The risk, at any rate, would become insignificant enough to be taken. Remilitarisation constitutes not only an insurance against a war of retribution. In view of the perfection of defensive fortifications, it would also constitute a guarantee against defeat should such a war break out . . .

The occupation of the demilitarised zone is the complement of Germany's rearmament. France and England tolerated the latter. They thus indicated, in the German view, that they will oppose nothing in Germany's new policy that has a " preparatory " character.

In addition, the neo-pacificism and conscientious objection on the part of the French Right in the Abyssinian affair is compromising. " It is proven," says Germany, " that France is no longer ready to defend her security. She will only fight for her territory." France has renounced all the barriers that she herself erected against aggression.

There remains England and her commitments under the Locarno Treaty. But if Germany believes that France will refuse to march, how can she anticipate that England will ? How is English resistance conceivable except in reply to an appeal from France and in collaboration with her ? " And finally," thinks Hitler, " the risk must be run. Our last act of military preparation is the key to freedom. Not to take the step means to remain enslaved."

If we tolerate the reoccupation of the Rhineland, the world will regard it as proven that France, while capable no doubt of defending her own territory, will submit to any other menace to her security, whether direct or indirect, such as German aggression in Central Europe. It would be the end of all our Central European friendships and of all collective security.

France, therefore, must prevent the reoccupation of the demilitarised Rhineland. But how ? Nobody dreams of declaring war against Germany. But, it is said, we might mobilise three classes, should Germany take the initiative. The proposal is absurd. There is no hope whatsoever of intimidating Germany by such methods.

They would not convince Hitler of our intention to wage an offensive war, a war incidentally, which would be highly repugnant to the whole nation.

There are only two methods of action, and they should be taken simultaneously. The first is also of a military nature. We must carry out the military dispositions laid down in the Treaty of Locarno. These consist of military agreements between England, France and Belgium. They consist above all in the stationing of British air squadrons on French and Belgian soil. By the mere fact of their being "on the continent" they would bring home to Germany England's certain and declared determination to resist German aggression against France and Belgium.

The second step is not simply a means of compensating the increase in Germany's offensive power. It would force Germany to abandon her enterprise. It would bring the renaissance of German imperialism to an unavoidable halt. I mean economic sanctions, to which Germany, even more than Italy, is highly vulnerable. A simple embargo on German exports would bring about rapid economic ruin of the Reich. Such sanctions would be demanded by us and carried out by the League.

Naturally, our attitude in the Italo-Abyssinian dispute has robbed us of a great deal of the authority necessary to convince world opinion of the justice of our claim. But we may yet hope that M. Laval's blunders will be remedied from now on. One thing remains certain. Unless we intend to abdicate in face of Germany's expansion and seek our safety in isolation, the reoccupation of the demilitarised zone demands effective resistance.

Today Locarno, Tomorrow Austria

Wladimir D'Ormesson in "Figaro," Paris

THE drama consist in this. On the one side there are two democracies with such a horror of war and violence that, in spite of their power, they do everything to avoid them. On the other side there is an uncontrolled and unscrupulous dictatorship (as we saw well enough on June 30 and July 24, 1934), which uses the pacific disposition of its neighbours to go from provocation to provocation. We may be sure that Hitler would never have executed the coup of March 16, 1935, (rearmament) if he had

thought that he was running a serious risk. Still less would he have occupied the Rhineland. But experience has shown him that he can do anything with impunity.

Unfortunate circumstances shattered the Stresa front with a fatal blow. Germany took advantage of it to provoke Europe. Let us face the facts. Nothing will stop Germany unless solemn warnings are explicitly given her. Today, the violation of Locarno; tomorrow, the violation of Austria; and afterwards a sudden attack at some other point. Why should she hestitate? On the one hand, the boxer delivers his punches. On the other side, the attorneys record them. Such is the state of Europe.

Firmness Now or Never

From "Le Temps," Paris

It was known that the Berlin Government would take advantage of the Italo-Abyssinian dispute to raise the question of the demilitarised Rhine zone. It was known that forces had been stationed on Rhenish territory in the disguise of militarised police. It was known that Germany had in mind some sort of negotiations for the summer, in the course of which Hitler was to make Germany's return to the League of Nations—which England thinks so important—conditional on the solution of the Rhine problem. But what could not have been foreseen was the brutality of German procedure. This procedure amounted to a unilateral denunciation of the Treaty of Locarno, which provides ample scope for conciliation and arbitration. Hitler simultaneously occupies the Rhine and offers us a new agreement. This is tantamount to proposing negotiations, after having seized the object of the negotiations in violation of existing agreements.

Germany has thrown off her mask. It is clear that Hitler's recent declarations to a Paris newspaper were a pure manoeuvre. France took Hitler at his word and made inquiries through her ambassador as to the bases of possible negotiation. The German Government then pretended that no negotiation was possible before the liquidation of the Italo-Abyssinian conflict. Its real answer was the unilateral repudiation of Locarno, which Hitler regards no doubt as the final test of France's firmness and of the solidarity of the League powers. Let there be no

mistake about it. If France and the other powers bound by the treaties of Versailles and Locarno and by the League Covenant do not react more firmly to this supreme act of defiance than they have to other German treaty violations, peace will be gravely endangered.

It is true that Germany has accompanied her move with an offer to negotiate. But what is this offer worth ? Nobody dreams of closing the door to sincere, honest and useful negotiations. But, equally, nobody negotiates with a pistol pointed at his head. If Germany, with her grandiose military preparations not yet complete, wishes to test the resistance of France and the Locarno powers, she must be shown that she has been guilty of one more psychological error ; and that France, for all her ardent desire of peace, will not yield to threats or intimidation.

The Fascist Leader for Understanding

Colonel de la Rocque, leader of the "Croix de Feu"

HITLER'S gesture appears to have caused astonishment. It is nevertheless the logical consequence of the policy of surrender that our rulers from both left and right have followed with lamentable continuity since 1920. History will read with stupor the speeches of our responsible leaders on the withdrawal of the control commissions, on the ratification of Locarno, on the Dawes Plan and the Young Plan, etc.

The attitude of the German governments has also, in spite of apparently different regimes, maintained a remarkable continuity. Bethmann-Hollweg's scrap of paper headed the list of all those that Germany has burnt since 1918. Must we be scandalised ? It is better to take Germany as she is, and not to attribute to Soviet Russia a strength and honesty that she does not possess. An understanding of these superior truths must animate our sincere activity in view of creating between Paris and Berlin a state of equilibrium and harmony.

Hitler, France's Pupil

From "Le Populaire," Paris (Socialist)

WE do not at any price or under any pretext accept the least measure of co-operation with our own imperialism. We are determined to denounce it for the same reasons that we denounce the imperialism facing us on the

other side of the Rhine. But we will denounce our own imperialism even more vigorously, as that is the special task of our sector in the international class front.

France's example has been followed by Hitler's Germany. France has admitted the right of might. Germany claims to benefit from the admission.

From now on we appeal to all workers of every kind to rely only on themselves to ward off war. We no longer want to see a people rise against another people, but all the peoples of the world against all their capitalist and fascist exploiters. That is what we must cry to the multitudes. We must see that our cry penetrates into Germany and Italy, in the name of our working-class and of the international proletariat . . . if there is still time.

The Cowardly British Cabinet

"Pertinax" in the "Echo de Paris"

THE views of the Foreign Office on German affairs are not very different from those of the Quai D'Orsay. Mr. Eden, the apostle of collective security, no doubt shares these views to a considerable extent. The Baldwins and the MacDonalds are the real sources of the pusillanimity that reigns in the British Cabinet. A tempest of public opinion roused the two men during the Italo-Abyssinian affair. This public opinion rests inert and anxious in face of Germany. The Prime Minister and his predecessor, therefore, have fallen back into their ingrained apathy . . .

The opinion of the man in the street, in England, is that everything in the Treaty of Versailles that was designed to restrain German sovereignty was, from the beginning, doomed to decrepitude and death. The demilitarised zone was the last remaining restriction on that sovereignty. Hence his indifference. He does not realise that the German act of March 7 is the prelude to territorial aggression.

OTHER COUNTRIES' VIEWS

Punishment Necessary

From the "Journal des Nations," Geneva (reflecting League opinion)

MARCH 16, 1935, October 3, 1935, March 7, 1936—the violation and repudiation of international agreements continues. Following well-

established tradition, Hitler's bomb exploded on a Saturday morning . . .

France is placed in a position of infinite delicacy. There is no doubt that war, the massacre of the innocents, is a much more serious thing than the unilateral denunciation of a treaty. The predecessor of France's present Foreign Minister tried in all his acts to attenuate the effect of sanctions against a government which violated the Covenant by letting loose war. Quite recently again, M. Flandin and M. Paul-Boncour regarded the renewed adjournment of the oil sanction as a great victory. A grave precedent was established, which certainly, if only psychologically, accelerated the gesture of violation of March 7, 1936.

The relative impunity of the government guilty of aggression in Abyssinia without doubt encouraged Hitler in the belief that the League of Nations is an empty word, that the Covenant could easily be violated. Had the oil sanction forced Fascism to abandon its war of aggression, Locarno would still be respected in Berlin. Peace is indivisible, so are the treaty-breakers.

Flagrant aggression cannot go unpunished, if punishment is to be meted out to those who merely threaten aggression.

Some Spanish Sympathy for Hitler

From "El Debate," Madrid (Right-Wing Catholic)

GERMAN diplomacy tries to justify its attitude by pointing to the Franco-Russian pact. The thesis is more than doubtful, and only German diplomacy has attempted to sustain it. Several months ago, the governments of London and Rome, not to mention Paris and Brussels, decided that the German arguments were invalid. And they are probably right. From the legal point of view, Hitler's reasoning has less force than when he reintroduced conscription. He could then at least point to the fact that the other powers had not disarmed.

Without doubt, the majority of peoples, though filled with apprehension as to the consequences of the act, will sympathise with the Chancellor. The unilateral demilitarisation of the zone ran counter to the sentiment of justice and equality among nations. Much is permitted to a victor. He cannot permanently deprive the vanquished of his rights, as was attempted in the case of Germany.

What Scandinavia Thinks

"*Göteborgs Handels—och Sjöfartstidning*," *Gothenburg, Sweden* (*Liberal*)

ONE begins to wonder whether the war can be postponed long enough to allow Germany to finish arming. But perhaps (Hitler's) assurances of peaceful intentions are useful so long as the Abbyssinian war is still raging, and the British fleet is tied up by it . . .

In one way the danger can be averted—if the German people will awaken from their mental aberration, and return to sanity. If they allow their present leaders to remain in power too long, the awakening will not come until Germany has had another 1918.

"*Dagens Nyheter*," *Stockholm*, (*Liberal*)

ONCE the first uneasiness at this latest expression of Germany's striving for equality has been allayed, it will no doubt be generally recognised that an historic era has ended which sooner or later *must* have come to an end. . . . Hitherto the adaptation of conditions to the needs of "dynamic" States has been made by war. This would have been the case in the World War too if America had not stepped in and transformed it into a defeat for what remained even afterwards potentially the strongest nation in Europe. Now Hitler demands that Germany shall have that place in the sun to which she has a right by virtue of the capability and energy of her people, and the density of her population. He desires peaceful measures, but gives warning of the "explosions" likely to occur if the road is barred. Let us hope that the "turbulent foolishness" Hitler has found in the Western powers will not infect the Nazi friends of peace, and cause difficulties in the process of adaptation ahead of us which would not be necessary if only reasonable consideration were shown and allowances made on all sides for the legitimate interests of the opposite party.

"*Tidens Tegn*," *Oslo*, (*Liberal*)

AGAINST a divided Western Europe and a Russia occupied at the moment in the East, Hitler takes his fateful step. If, however, this step causes the removal of the last remnants of irritating elements from the Versailles Treaty, and the inclusion of Germany in the collective striving for peace in Europe—and this is what we prefer to hope—then it may after all signify the beginning of a new era in the history of Europe.

"Politiken," Copenhagen, (Radical-Socialist)

If, as a result of the occupation of the Rhineland, discussions may continue without fresh conflict, then there is a chance of establishing political stability among the States—the only condition on which mutual understanding can take root. But skilful statesmen will be required to turn the many sources of strife into a single peaceful stream. Can they be found?

Pacific, but Blind

From "Izvestia," Moscow

The impression made by the repudiation of the Locarno Treaty is considerably weaker than might have been expected. German Fascism's three years of rule has accustomed the world to much that would earlier have been considered impossible. In addition, the only decisive reaction against the tearing up of a freely accepted treaty—the advance of French troops into the demilitarised zone—would mean war. But nobody with commonsense will begin a preventive war. A preventive war is suicide caused by fear of death.

When, therefore, the representatives of the interested powers begin their speeches by exhorting everybody to keep calm, their appeals are superfluous. It is a pity that part of the peace-loving, but short-sighted, British press has been unable to see through the German game. It does not realise that the German proposal for a series of bilateral pacts is an attempt to divide the ranks of Germany's opponents, and an attempt to sow illusions among the peace-hungry masses, in order to gain time for the next *fait accompli*. These people will only come to their senses when Germany, after further peaceful assurances, begins to drop bombs from aeroplanes. It is not a question of speeches, but of action for the organisation of a front of peace-loving powers.

GOERING AT SCHOOL

General Goering paid a surprise visit to the Lessing School last week. He followed the lessons and took the opportunity to put questions himself. He asked what the decisive motive in the development of German culture was. The prompt answer, "Race," pleased him visibly. The schoolboys also knew that the leader alone is the decisive factor in history.—*Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, Berlin.*

TELLING GERMANY



Garvens, "Kladderadatsch," Berlin

JOHN BULL TO GERMANY: "OF COURSE, THERE CAN BE NO QUESTION OF ENCIRCLEMENT."

GERMANY'S CLAUSTROPHOBIA

ECONOMICS OR POLITICS?

From "Der Deutsche Volkswirt," Berlin

The "Deutsche Volkswirt" stands in close relation to Dr. Schacht, German Minister of Economy and President of the Reichsbank. Its columns are believed often to express his criticisms of the more unorthodox and revolutionary supporters of Herr Hitler. The following though published before March 7, was evidently written with foreknowledge of the events of that day.

THE encirclement of Germany has become so general a topic of conversation, that German economy must take stock of the situation and consider the prospects of meeting established facts and dangers. Future rearmament will demand great deeds and sacrifices, which in turn demand solid psychological foundations. We must therefore consider whether the great strengthening of Germany's position in the world owing to rearmament is limited or paralysed by events in the field of foreign policy in the narrower sense and, on the other hand, what chances there are of turning these events to fruitful account.

Three facts have recently promoted the idea that Germany is encircled. The first, the Franco-Russian pact, is nothing new. But it has been placed in the limelight once more by parliamentary discussions in France. In spite of the encouraging hesitation as to the advisability of ratifying the pact, there can be little doubt that it will in fact be ratified. The abolition of the last traces of equality under which Germany suffers, especially in the west, is thus all the more justified and necessary.

Hitler's Germany is capable of giving assurances or guarantees of peaceful intentions, without forfeiting her honour. If they are given, our claims can be pushed through with still greater prospects of success. The Fuehrer, in his thirteen points of May 21, affirmed German readiness for collective cooperation with a view to keeping the peace in Europe. At any rate, dislike of war is not confined to Western Europe. Under these circumstances, a discussion of a western airpact with Germany this year does not appear hopeless, provided that German equality is conceded.

The Italo-Abyssinian conflict which put an end to the peace efforts of the European powers last year, must be brought to a close. English

policy seems directed to securing this end without a European conflagration. Perhaps this is because England is certain that even without new sanctions there can be no peace in Africa detrimental to her interests, and that even a victorious Italy will be more in need of economic and financial support than an Italy that began the war with its last reserves. Such a development seems suitable for strengthening such tendencies as the Stresa front.

The unmistakable rapprochement between England and Russia, and the undeniable coolness of Anglo-German relations (the latter fact is not solely to be attributed to the former) has fostered the idea of German encirclement even more than the Franco-Russian pact. Although no honest Englishman can doubt that German rearmament is directed least of all against England, the German danger is exploited in order to justify a large rearmament programme which is repugnant to the average Englishman. A remnant of cultural antipathy against the new Germany remains. But England, in greater degree than other peoples, constructs her foreign policy in the light of her interests, not of philosophy or sentiment. For her coming struggle with Japan she needs Russia on her side and a quiet Europe, the latter partly in order to cover Russia's rear.

The more England puts her interests in China and the Far East in the foreground of her policy, the more will she try to exert a certain pressure on Germany. On the other hand, it must not be overlooked that Russia is not unconditionally ready to pull the chestnuts out of the fire for England. The Soviet regime fears war like none other, and Russia is a sated power. The Anglo-Russian system may easily collapse. It is not yet clear how the latest events in Tokyo will affect the situation. Perhaps the English will one day realise that they will get further with a Germany whose rightful claims are admitted and whose share in the world's raw materials is assured. Germany must take into consideration the economic frontiers given by her geographical and political position. But she has no reason to overlook the economic and political possibilities that the world offers and to deny herself the use of them in the struggle for her existence. In this respect, more correct relations between Germany and Russia are possible, since the two countries complement one another in the economic sense to a greater extent than most.

In respect of economics and geography, special assistance is forthcoming from the third segment of the circle round Germany, that of Central and Southern Europe. Czechoslovakia has an uneasy conscience

before Europe and the Germanic peoples. This is reflected in Mr. Hodza's exaggerated enthusiasms. In view of political divergencies and economic realities, he cannot bring into being his anti-German combination stretching from Prague to the Black Sea. He may succeed temporarily in drawing Austria into the Little Entente. But the more Germany succeeds in turning economic, geographical, cultural and diplomatic factors to good account in her foreign policy—after a suitable measure of rearmament—the more certainly will she in the long run achieve her aims everywhere.

THE RUSSIAN BEAR COMES WEST

by EMIL GRAVÉ

From "Die Neue Weltbühne," published in Prague by German Communist emigrés

At the beginning of February plans for a Soviet-Rumanian treaty were prepared. Titulescu's aim is a bold one. The Rumanian Foreign Minister has been able to create for his country a key position in the south-east, and therefore a European mission as well. Once the treaty comes into being, Rumania will become a bridge between Russia and Czechoslovakia, that is, between Russia and all Central Europe. Rumania is becoming the fortified hinterland of Czechoslovakia, and an advanced post of Soviet Russia's security policy. Germany's attempt to win Rumania for her own system of alliances and thus to thrust a wall between Prague and Moscow has collapsed. Rumania has refused to become a gate for German expansion to the south-east. Bucharest sees its chance in the creation of a watertight eastern European bloc. Hungary is Germany's only hope.

The great eastern bloc reaches to the gates of Vienna in the west, to the Aegean Sea and the Turkish-Syrian frontier in the south. It is becoming a desirable ally for Great Britain. Still more important, however, is the fact that the chief source of its strength, Soviet Russia, has now won direct access to the boundaries of Silesia, Saxony and Bavaria. The Conservative *Paris-Midi* wrote recently that the Red Army will now appear in Central Europe as a force counter-balancing the strength of Germany. In the west, it has even been considered whether it might

not be possible to win the Soviet Union as a guarantor of Austria's integrity. Litvinov recommended instead the strengthening of the Covenant of the League. Participation in a Danube pact would be too heavy a commitment for Russia.

Hardly had Laval fallen when the Soviet State achieved an importance in Europe that it never enjoyed even in the days of Barthou. The western powers recognise that Russian influence reaches into Central Europe, and that only the Soviet Union itself has a clear idea of its limitations there. The Paris press is calling for the substitution of the Russia for Italy as guarantor of security in Central and South-eastern Europe. The Soviet Union will not spring into Italy's place. But nevertheless Italy's retreat from central and south-east Europe strengthens Soviet influence in that zone. A political vacuum arose that only a great power can fill.

For the second time, the antagonism between Moscow and Rome is becoming clear, In 1934 the Soviet Union, which was the first power to take up connections with the Little Entente and Balkan Entente, closed the door to Italy in the south-west. Today the Soviet Union is gradually taking the place that the Italians abandoned. Mussolini has done the trick. Italy is not only finished as a great power, she is also severely shaken as a power in south-east Europe. Even Austria is seeking new supports ; she can no longer trust Italy fully. As a great European power the Soviet Union will certainly profit from the collapse of Italy. Its relations to Jugoslavia can be exploited more profoundly. Jugoslavia has hitherto not followed the active pro-Soviet road of Rumania and Czechoslovakia. Today, now that Russia is freeing Jugoslavia from Italian pressure, a change in the direction of co-operation must come.

France is also taking an active role in eastern Europe once more. She is beginning with the revival of the Franco-Jugoslav alliance—it is said that the Regent, Prince Paul, declared in Paris that the Jugoslav army will in all eventualities stand by France's side. The ratification of the Franco-Soviet pact will strengthen Soviet Russia's powers of attraction in all east Europe. Belgrade will have to join the Moscow-Bucharest-Prague-Paris ring.

The great Eastern bloc is forming with the declared support of the two great western powers. England has learnt to appreciate the powers of resistance and initiative of eastern Europe. King Carol was advised in London to strive for an understanding with the Soviets. In Paris he

declared his approval of Titulescu's foreign policy. For the first time London favours the formation of the eastern European bloc. Flandin has only to return to the French policy of security, and in a few days there will follow the very concentration of forces that Laval tried to break up. Today, France has the grand opportunity of leaning simultaneously on England and on the eastern bloc.

It seems that Germany has finally lost the game for south-east Europe. German Fascism played a determined and clever game. The lack of determination in the west favoured it. But Germany could never guarantee the security of the States she wished to win. On the contrary, German Fascism seeks to undermine the existence of the national States that issued from the world war. In doing so it prepared their alliance with the Soviet Union.

PAPER WALLS

by LUCIEN ROMIER

From "Figaro," Paris

THE Germans are ready to believe that hostile powers, united for the damnation of Germany, are organising her encirclement. This idea is working on the imagination of an exalted and suffering people, particularly on that of a youth that believes in its racial mission; and it is much more dangerous than imperialism in the strict sense of the word. It inverts values. In its light unsophisticated minds regard violence as a legitimate means of defence against foreign conspiracy, and as a means of forestalling it.

The myth of encirclement has gained such a wide currency that Mr. Eden found it necessary to deal with it in his inaugural speech as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. But protests are hardly effective in combating the myth. Facts are better, especially the facts of relative armaments. Is Germany encircled, or threatened by encirclement, by the offensive weapons of other European Powers?

France's whole military system is founded on the principle of a defensive organisation. The new fortifications in the East, and the practical consequences of them for the utilisation of our armies, have given this defensive organisation an obvious rigidity. Some have even

considered them scarcely reconcilable with the mobility necessary to fulfil our obligations under the Covenant. France is in a strong defensive position, but the position is severely circumscribed. It does not in any way threaten Germany. The present efforts of Belgium, Holland and Switzerland to fortify their frontiers are even more obviously defensive and limited in range.

Great Britain has started on a vast programme of rearmament, and will carry it out in the course of the next few years. The programme is not conceived in terms of European, but of imperial strategy. Great Britain, far from looking out for a chance to use her military resources



Will Dyson, "Daily Herald," London.

"Why are we up here, daddy?"
"Didn't you notice the nasty look that sheep gave us?"

in Europe, is trying to economise her strength in that direction by means of collective security or by means of direct bargaining with Germany herself. Italy, owing to her preoccupations in Abyssinia, does not menace Germany. The Little Entente, by definition, is on the defensive.

There remains Russia. In theory, the number of effectives in Russia amounts to between 1,200,000 and 1,300,000. At least a third would have to be kept in the Far East facing Japan. Another third would be kept to maintain order and to guard the immense frontier from the Black Sea to Turkestan. The Soviet General Staff would not dream of attacking Germany with the remaining third. It would lack transport and a reliable supply system, and would be far away from the new industrial centres in Eastern Russia.

Thus Germany has before her and in her neighbourhood only States whose range is circumscribed and whose attitude is strictly defensive. Such States would have great difficulty in drawing up a concerted plan of action. In the middle lies Germany, with a trained army of 750,000, which will become a million in eighteen months. Material and equipment is of the highest quality. The army will enjoy complete freedom of manoeuvre, so complete indeed that the Dutch and Belgians are afraid of an unexpected attack against the North Sea ports, the Swiss of an attack through Olten towards Neuchatel and Lyon, and the Russians of an attack towards the Ukraine—all at the same time.

Where is the encirclement ? We see nothing but a chain of pacts. They are made of paper, not of iron.

YOUTH SPEAKS

Following is an extract from a "Letter to a French friend" in "Hochschule und Ausland," Berlin, a German paper which strives for understanding between the youth of all nations.

HARDLY three months have gone by since our evening walk over the heights to the west of Paris. Do you remember that night ? We tried to discover why the relations between French and German remain so unhappy and, apparently, for ever poisoned. We recognised fairly clearly the forces working against friendship between France and Germany. But we found no reason why we should not face the problem of so harmonising the natural differences between our two peoples that

they might complement instead of destroy one another. We agreed that such a problem confronts our generation with an urgency unknown to any other. We realised the difficulties of the task . . .

You Frenchmen are apt to regard Latinity and civilisation as the same thing. You therefore understand German history only in so far as it incorporates Roman and Catholic forces. The original contribution of Germanic man to the work of the middle Ages often appears to you to be the relic of primordial savagery. But you should have been able to see that the Germanic contribution has ever since the times of Luther been advancing into the foreground, and that Germanic forces have now achieved a clarity and a strength that enables them to create their own German spiritual culture.

You must begin your studies here. It is important for you to grasp the succession of our spiritual ancestors, which leads from Master Eckart through Luther, Herder, Hoelderlin and Nietzche to the spirit of National Socialism, and that of its creator and leader. These names may lead you to cry out : Heretics ! And it is true that German thought in all its manifestations invariably appeared heretical to the French and Latin-humanistic mind. Perhaps this was because the world is determined by law, rule and canon, and not by the " natural freedom of God's children."

If you want to understand Germany from within, you must free yourself from the absolutist claims of Latinity. We don't need Latin humanism, as we have direct access to the Greeks. Our rejection of western standards is not the fruit of barbarian prejudice against " civilisation," but of our intention to build our own universal world. This world includes the history of *all* Europe. You must admit that a nation with the greatness and past of Germany cannot seek the centre of gravity of its spiritual development in the lands that were once the frontier provinces of the Roman Empire. Those lands brought decisive contributions to the formation of the German mind. But so did the Germanic tribes that the Roman legions never reached . . .

Our youth has a very sensitive appreciation of the events of our day. It is passionately devoted to the new world. I advise you to give some thought to this youth. You will then feel that in the great revolution that youth is witnessing, masses are not being led blindly towards an unknown goal, but that people and youth are gripped in the profoundest sense. We measure the genuineness of our aims by the belief of our youth.

As we wandered over the heights near Paris that night we discussed the youth of our two countries. You thought that one of the deepest antagonisms between France and Germany lay in the different valuations put on youth. In Germany youth is treated as a way of life in itself, with its own rights and responsibility, whose judgment is often recognised as unprejudiced and free. It forms a front of its own that contributed decisively to the success of the revolution. In France, on the other hand, youth, in the framework of the closed and still unshaken structure of society, is a time of preparation, without claims to consideration or responsibility. It is in the deepest sense a school. One should not put the French youth movement on a level with the German one. The French youth has never claimed the right to intervene actively in current events. What we in Germany hear of the French youth is often nothing more than the voice of adults or of middle-aged men, who politically, intellectually, or artistically, pretend to be the advance guard . . .

In my wanderings in Savoy, Normandy and Burgundy, I got to know your peasantry. I have a high opinion of its strength. But I could never understand why such forces remain silent. France's crown of glory means little to us. We are bad at museums, and have our own achievements to marvel at. But we would give a lot to feel France's heart beating, as you can feel the heartbeats of National-Socialist Germany today.

PACTOMANIA OR PACTOPHOBIA

by FREIHERR WERNER VON RHEINBABEN

The following, by a former German Secretary of State, and delegate to the League of Nations and Disarmament Conference, was written before the re-occupation of the demilitarised zone.

From the "Europäische Revue," Berlin

FRANCE, with her possessions considerably increased as a result of the war, has everything that a great nation needs. Germany, on the other hand, has not. France, "the proprietor," defends the dictated system of 1919 with all her own strength and that of her political allies. She calls the German attitude a "menace to peace," or at best, as "uncontrolled and unlimited dynamism." Germany considers the recovery of such conditions as are necessary for her political and economic life a

sacred duty and the most natural thing in the world. She therefore regards as an enemy anyone who forcibly denies her the possessions and rights that are necessary for her national life, or who attempts to destroy the German people living beyond the Versailles frontiers.

Germany, deprived at Versailles of raw materials, territory and population, fell into the throttling clutches of French sanctionist policy and lost her wealth in the inflation. The loan period followed, which brought an artificial recovery on the basis of foreign money. Then came the second crisis, the threatening collapse, and the final concentration of all the forces of the nation through the medium of National-Socialism. Four million unemployed were led back to work by means of a State controlled economy on the basis of heavy indebtedness, while at the same time foreign trade and the import of raw materials could only be maintained with the greatest difficulty and by the most complicated machinery. What a difference compared with the corresponding development in France! Why are Germany's efforts to hold open the door to peaceful revision always interpreted in France as aggression, when their causes are so obvious? In Spring, 1919, France forced her eastern neighbour into a position which meant that Germany, as a nation, people and economy, must either collapse, or rise anew by throwing off the yoke imposed on her. Germany has chosen the second road, but not without the severest struggles, upheavals and crises . . .

These questions lead on to the famous formula: the responsibility of Germany and France before Europe. On the one side stands France with her pacts, treaties collectivism and League of Nations; on the other Germany, with her preference for direct negotiations between State and State, and with her antipathy against comprehensive collective treaties between a large number of States, with unclear, dangerous aims and uncontrollable mental reservations. Suppose Germany said tomorrow: "I will enter the League of Nations and am ready to sign the Franco-Russian pact and the proposed pact between Austria and the Little Entente." Does that mean that Germany would give up her struggle for full equality? Certainly not! Would it help Europe if Germany entered the system of collective security, which is now being being constructed without her, often with obviously anti-German tendencies? Or would insincerity on the one side be met by mistrust on the other? . . .

We are deeply disturbed at the formation of groups in Europe, and dislike the way in which our recovery of the right to rearm has been made

a pretext for an arms race and for military agreements, in comparison to which the period before the world war seems like a haven of peace. Armed Germany, says the Paris press, is dangerous. Armed France is a guarantee of peace. . . We cannot take part in any system that deprives the German people of its rights. Nothing is changed by the oft-repeated assertion that the collective system is not directed against Germany . . .

Where is the remedy? First, there is a certain probability that the surfeit of pacts in all directions, which we sometimes call pactomania, will not yield the required amount of goodwill and solidity in the course of their mass production, but that they will finally lead to absurdity. Matters have already reached the stage when leading politicians of certain States are unclear as to the extent of their commitments, and when different legal experts or different political parties interpret a pact "according to circumstances." The danger and stupidity of the refined and distorted collectivism of our day is evident . . .

Secondly, germs of a less pessimistic view lie in the fact that nothing is static. Anyone who has studied the post-war era with its constant interchange of groupings, spheres of influence, and friendships, can hardly believe that we have now, in the middle of the Abyssinian war, reached the end of a period. Life and development go on. Until something new turns up, we must fulfil the daily duties of the present, in order to make the future more bearable. That applies to relations between France and Germany. In spite of all differences, both countries must live beside one another somehow. France has, and extends, her friendships. Germany is far from thinking that she has exhausted the essence and content of her foreign policy in her relations to France. Her naval agreement with England, and the solemnly declared wish to live on good terms with England, show that the conditions and foundation of fertile international co-operation are present, as soon as the two partners, France and England, are ready for it . . .

GRAMMAR

School Teacher: Percival, why are you half an hour late? What was the matter?

Percival: I went out with Pa to a lynching party, and we stayed until the last man was hung.

School Teacher (*severely*): Was hanged, Percival.—*The Log* (*U.S. Naval Academy*).

ANDORRA'S WAR OVER A TELEPHONE

Tiny Stronghold of the Past

From the "Berliner Tageblatt"

UNREST is seething in the small Pyrenean republic of Andorra. Elections were held last December. They resulted in a victory for the so-called Prince's party, but did not satisfy the growing opposition. The High Council assembled and tried in vain to restore harmony. The Andorrans are proud of their medieval institutions which, they assert, are founded on rights conceded to them by Charlemagne. Roland is said to have blown his famous horn in their steep mountain valleys.

Since feudal times, the kings of France—now their successors, the presidents—and the Bishop of Seo del Urgel, have been the sovereign, ruling princes of Andorra, maintaining representatives in the small state. The presidents of France have commissioned the governor of the neighbouring province of Perpignan to exercise their rights, while an official of the Madrid Foreign Office advises the Bishop of Urgel. For centuries the little state has lived a secluded life. The inhabitants have made large profits out of smuggling, particularly from tobacco smuggling. Any one of them who has been to Barcelona is considered a much-travelled and clever man.

In 1882 France got a concession for a telegraph line through Andorran territory. The result was "war." The Andorrans, indignant at the innovation, tore up the telegraph poles and drove out the French engineers. Arms were issued to the people. But the authorities soon realised that they were not strong enough to conquer France, and condescended to a compromise. The telegraph line was laid down on payment of an indemnity, and since the bargain relieved the Andorran citizens of taxation, the arrangement pleased them so much that they made no difficulties over other French concessions for a high-road and electrical installation. Ski railways were laid down for the benefits of tourists, and a proposed casino was intended to rival Monte Carlo.

But the simple customs of Andorra suffered under these alien influences. The young men, hitherto entirely submissive to the Council, demanded the right of suffrage and participation in the government.

French gendarmes from Perpignan advanced into the country and left it again only on energetic protests from Spain, who wished to preserve the rights of the Bishop of Urgel.

The Andorrans began to fear for their independence. They regarded the very superficial control of the two princes as an infringement of their rights. Two parties were formed. One wished to place Andorra under the protection of the League of Nations and cut off her relations with the two co-Princes, the other, formed of Conservatives, wanted to maintain the present position. The Princes' party won last December. But hardly had it assumed the responsibilities of office when it came once more into conflict with France.

On an order from the French Postmaster-General, the French began to lay down a telephone line. The Andorrans declared that the telephone was unlawful and the order an illegal interference in the affairs of a foreign state. A telephone line is not a telegraph line. They forbade the French engineers to cross the frontier. Once more the Governor of Perpignan intervened, and warned the Andorrans to come to their senses. He threatened to close the frontier should the Andorrans persist in their opposition. Andorra turned once more to Spain, and Madrid has begun negotiations with Paris. In return a Spaniard has obtained a concession for the installation of a wireless station. The old Andorrans curse the modern times that have complicated their lives. They want to tear up the high-roads, destroy the telegraph poles, and return to their old mule-paths.

COMMISSIONERS FOR OATHS?

The Consul of the United States at Geneva, Mr. Prentiss Gilbert, has, on behalf of the President and the Government of the United States, sent the International Labour Office an official invitation to participate in and to send delegates to the Third World Power Conference and the Second Congress of the International Commission on Large Dams.—*From a communiqué issued by The International Labour Office, Geneva.*

PATRIOTISM

Very admirable is the patriotism of the thieves and robbers of Damascus who struck from stealing a month ago. No cases of theft have been reported since the beginning of the strike. One cannot but notice the common political consciousness of the masses, regardless of whether this is being directed in the proper channel or not.—*Palestine Post.*

BAD TIMES FOR LIONS

"Il Travaso delle Idee," Rome

THE BRITISH LION AND THE LION OF JUDAH DISCUSS THE SITUATION

"Humanité," Paris.

A ROMAN LENT

"Le Canard Enchaîné," Paris

"We have retaken Makalle!"

"North China Herald," Shanghai

SHANGHAI—
THE HAUNTED CITY

"La Dépêche," Toulouse

"When will this ox of a lion realise that I am chairman of the R.S.P.C.A.?"

"Le Canard Enchaîné," Paris.

"Set up the page this way. First, French infantry cross the Rhine; second, the artillery; third, tanks; fourth, an appeal for calm."

"THE LEAGUE POWERS AGREE . . . ."



"Sondagsnisse Strix," Stockholm

CALM PLEASE!

"Le Canard Enchaine," Paris

"Don't worry, old man. The occupation is purely symbolic."

"La Lumière," Paris

"They are going to redistribute raw materials."

"Is beefsteak a raw material?"

"Marianne," Paris

THE HOUSE-PAINTER CHANGES HIS PATTERN



Low, "Evening Standard," London

"SO YOU WON'T BE PEACEFUL, EH, YOU BIG BULLIES?"

Leporini, "Il Travaso delle Idee," Rome

WELCOME COLLEAGUES!

Great Britain, according to "Il Travaso," has undertaken to buy Yugoslavia's surplus pigs, which sanctions make it impossible for her to sell to Italy

"Brennessel," Munich

THE PACT SYSTEM

"Hold tight, boys. The fat fellow will break our necks"

"Cyrano," Paris

THE BARTERED BRIDE

M. Herriot unites Stalin and Marianne

CATHOLIC ENGLAND

From " Der Angriff," Berlin

It is very noticeable in the German Press that an effort is being made to show that everything is much worse—or at least as bad—in other countries. Criticism of butter shortage in Germany is met by tales of scarcity in England; " More Religious Strife in Great Britain " is a frequently seen headline. Here a specially commissioned writer in Dr. Goebbels's organ " reveals " another unsuspected state of affairs in this country.

THERE are three million Catholics in England, less than ten per cent. of the population. Most of them are found in the Midlands, in Northern Ireland and in Scotland. The percentage in the South is far smaller.

As regards religious conviction, England is a purely Protestant country. The mass of the population regards itself as genuinely Protestant, and the slightest attempt on the part of the churches to exert political influence would be answered by a popular upheaval. English legislation aims at excluding all Roman influence, with a view to avoiding renewed disturbances and church strife. Why, then, talk about " Catholic England " ? If we add that of 615 Members of Parliament a mere dozen and a half are members of the Catholic Church the subject appears more paradoxical than ever.

Owing to the anti-Roman attitude of the English satisfactory data is more difficult to come by in England than in other countries where Catholicism is numerically of greater weight. The Catholic Church profits by this situation in no small degree. *It flourishes in secret*, partly to avoid notoriety, partly because its existence must not and cannot be admitted and, finally, because nobody appears to be interested in it. In England nobody ever asks questions about religious convictions....

A few facts reveal where these unknown influences are at work. An extraordinarily high percentage of Catholics is found among the senior advocates, from whose ranks the judges are drawn. The biggest and most expensive modern church buildings in England are Catholic. Still more important is the fact that the majority of the old English nobles in the House of Lords remain Roman Catholic. The proportion is said

to be seventy per cent. The figure is not very significant as it concerns only those who are actually active in the Upper House. But the fact remains that the ancient and wealthy landed proprietors, owning enormous latifundia, are for the greater part Roman Catholic.

These data suffice to show that the influence of Catholicism increases as we climb the social ladder. It is well known that English foreign affairs, particularly the Foreign Office itself, are in the hands of Roman Catholics. Since the members of the higher nobility everywhere play an important rôle as Governors and Viceroys, and occupy several key positions at home, the astounding fact emerges that within the ranks of the ruling classes England has remained far more Catholic than many a purely Catholic country.

Cloistered Public Schools

Let us consider the purely human, and therefore also the political, attitude to life of the ruling Protestant castes. This attitude is a result of education. The influence of public education on the cultured classes in England is far greater than that of family education. The normal English family of means sends its children to a boarding school at an early age. From that moment the child never sees his parents' house except on visits. Since the father was also educated at Eton or Harrow or Winchester, he knows perfectly well that his son is being brought up according to his own ideas. But the decisive point is that all these public schools and universities, internally and externally, in their attitude and in their tradition, are nothing more than protestant cloisters. Their keynote is "protestant Catholicism."

It is here that the ruling caste is fashioned. And it is fashioned in a spirit that does indeed recognise and respect the religious difference on a certain plane, but which ceases to recognise it in all matters that affect the fundamental religious attitude in political judgment. Genuinely Roman Catholic influences have a far greater effect on the life of the British nation than the average resident ever suspects.

Strictly speaking, only the outsider can recognise these facts. The most certain symptom of the situation is the average English appreciation of, for example, German affairs. Press reports of the Saar plebiscite a year ago were not so much an indication of anti-German feeling as a proof of the extent to which Catholic reporting and judgment can prevent

the realisation of the simplest facts. At the moment proof is forthcoming in another field. The views of the ruling classes on the subject of the Abyssinian conflict coincide with those of the Pope.

POGROMS IN BELFAST

by FRANK C. HANIGHEN

From "The Commonweal," (Catholic Weekly) New York

EVERY July 12 in Belfast, Orangemen parade, sing anti-Catholic songs and engage in violent clashes with Catholics. Sometimes only a few heads are broken ; sometimes extensive riots take place with many people killed and much property damaged. In any case, the average person dismisses the matter as an unfortunate evidence that religious fanaticism still exists, that the Irish question remains unsettled—or merely that the Irish like to break heads. But the matter is not so simple. These annual disturbances are, in fact, anti-Catholic pogroms. Much as in Nazi Germany, they are either incited or tolerated by the government. The Ulster government, no less than the Third Reich, is well aware of the value of arousing religious hatred to divert public attention from real issues. For the leaders of the Ulster government, being primarily politicians, must maintain their political power, and at the same time they must serve the vested interests whom they represent. An Ulster Lodge member shouting "To hell with the Pope" is actually less a symbol of sectarian bitterness than of political and economic struggle.

The roots of this struggle are not difficult to find. Ulster is largely an industrial centre. Yet there are few industrial countries which have a panel of governing officials so openly representing big business. Not a single representative of labour . . . Not a single Catholic, although Catholics number over one-third of the population.

Of course, this is the top of a pyramid, the base of which is parliamentary government elected by universal manhood suffrage. Yet the method of gerrymandering has so effectively limited the scope of dissenting elements that the government has, at least until recently, no trouble in keeping a majority. A chart of the electoral districts presents a fantastic picture of gerrymandering, of dividing up Catholic and Labour constituencies. But when minorities are so unfairly represented and

there is a large labouring class subject to trade-union agitation, there must be effective weapons of force and suppression to implement this regime. Accordingly, the Special Powers Acts, passed as temporary measures during former periods of disorder, have become the permanent law of the land. Recently a committee of the British Council of Civil Liberties, all Englishmen and non-Catholics, investigated conditions in Belfast and discovered that English law and government has suffered some appalling transformations through enforcement of the Special Powers Acts.

The report which they issued is long, detailed and heavily documented. But briefly, its findings are as follows: (1) *Habeas Corpus* is practically a dead letter; men are constantly being arrested without warrant and held for considerable periods, without being arraigned or given opportunity to consult with counsel. (2) Houses are searched without warrants, often in the middle of the night and with brutality offered to occupants. (3) The judiciary is hardly worthy of the name of justice; most of the magistrates are simply ex-police-officers without any legal training and are for the most part Protestants (among the eleven higher officials of the magistracy only one is a Catholic). (4) Prisoners are maltreated and subjected to third-degree methods. (5) The Home Minister may intern prisoners for any length of time and his actions are not subject to review by court of law. (6) Possession of explosives is punishable by death. (7) The Legislature has in effect handed over power to make laws to the executive, by authorising the Home Minister to make any regulations he sees fit in defence of law and order.

Now these are drastic regulations in any Anglo-Saxon country, and in a part of the United Kingdom they represent an astonishing break with the English tradition of law and constitutional procedure. But the grave economic situation in Ulster demanded strong measures. Ulster, with the exception of some Welsh areas, is that section of the United Kingdom where the depression has been especially severe and where its improvement has been most strikingly lacking. Ship-building, linen manufacture and other forms of commerce which make up the industrial economy of Ulster have been particularly hard hit, with consequent unemployment and unrest.

This situation, by 1932, bore fruit in serious evidences of discontent among business men, farmers and labourers. In the ranks of the latter, it was inevitable that trade-union activity should increase and that a radical movement should appear. Protestant and Catholic workers

showed signs of forgetting their sectarian differences and of uniting for betterment of wages and working conditions. Communist tendencies were apparent in the new Irish Unemployed Workers Association.

The government acted, as might be expected, in defence of its political power and allied economic interests. The radical wing of labour was dealt with by the Special Powers Acts.

But the middle classes and the great rank and file of labour who were trying to unite in trade unions had to be handled by the more subtle weapon of religious fanaticism. It was not the first time that the governing powers had resorted to this. In 1920, Belfast workers started to follow the great post-war swing toward trade-union organisation which marked Britain's labour movement and were effectively prevented from succeeding by the anti-Catholic propaganda which had its part in the serious disorders of that and the following years. As a Belfast trade-union official said to me last fall, " Whenever we try to unite Protestants and Catholics, they turn on the tap of religious strife."

It was fitting, then, that the head of the government should inaugurate this campaign. On July 12, Lord Craigavon said at Poyntzpass, " Ours is a Protestant government and I am an Orangeman," and followed this a few months later with, " I do not care a snap of my fingers so long as I have the staunch, loyal and Protestant majority at my back in the Ulster Parliament."

But it remained for his Cabinet ministers to drive home the moral and to indicate the means by which the " staunch, loyal and Protestant majority " could continue its preponderance. Unemployment, it was suggested, could best be cured by the religious approach. Thus Sir Basil Brooke declared on July 12 at Newtownbutler: " Many in this audience employ Catholics, but I have not one about the place. Catholics are out to destroy Ulster with all their might and power."

The government's efforts were successful. Many Catholics lost their jobs to Protestants. Yet Craigavon and his associates became aware they had started a movement whose momentum was likely to get out of hand. For the Ulster Protestant League has gone much further in anti-Catholic propaganda and has attacked the government for dealing too leniently with Catholics. This new high in fanaticism, as a matter of fact, was the expression of more than bigotry. It was the spearhead of a revolt among Protestant lower and middle classes against their big-business Protestant government. Craigavon and his government were

now the objects of a serious political attack from the " staunch, loyal and Protestant " voters whom he so long and so efficiently had manipulated.

This was the ferment, then, which produced the grave riots of June and July of last year—the worst since 1922.

The opening gun was fired early in May, when a Catholic publican was shot. Attacks on Catholic districts during the Jubilee festivities followed and a Catholic street was bombed May 30, by a Protestant mob. On June 12 a serious riot occurred. The climax came on July 12. The Orange procession of 40,000 men singing anti-Catholic songs and shouting insults at Catholics began rioting after a revolver shot was fired. The Unionist press alleged that a Catholic fired this shot and thus started the trouble. Yet no one was hit.

The Orange mobs then invaded Catholic areas, burned Catholics' houses, evicted the occupants with their furniture, killed a number of individuals and destroyed much property. Rioting continued for two weeks thereafter and order was established with some difficulty with the aid of imperial troops. According to reliable sources there were nine killed, over 200 wounded and property damage estimated at over $100,000. Figures furnished by the Catholic diocese are particularly impressive: 73 Catholics' houses burned, 430 houses emptied of Catholics and 2,241 Catholics evicted from their dwellings.

It is significant that most of these evictions occurred in the working-class district near the docks, where many Catholics have held jobs . . . Year after year this area is stormed by Protestant mobs, and year after year the tide of Protestants sweeps closer to the docks, taking possession of whole streets and securing jobs in the warehouses. When I visited this quarter three months after the riots, I discovered a true line of demarcation between Catholics and Protestants in the form of a ten-foot high sheet-iron fence blocking off a number of streets and tracing, by its close approach to the docks, the advancing battle-line of Protestants seeking Catholics' jobs.

Being " disloyal," according to the government, they deserve to lose these jobs. Yet, canvassing opinion in this quarter, I discovered nothing which could be described as " disloyalty." The voters here return Labour members to Parliament over Nationalist candidates. The Nationalists themselves work for a united Ireland, it is true, but by constitutional means. The families of many of the Catholics killed in the riots numbered men who had served with the British forces in the

last war. In the dockyard area, there are no units of the Irish Republican Army. In fact, the few republicans in Belfast live, for the most part, in the Falls Road area which suffered comparatively little from the riots. The police gave Catholics little or no protection against Protestant mobs. Late in June, the Home Secretary rescinded a ban on public processions, a measure which the British Inspector of Police demanded as a safeguard against riots. Just before July 12, police received orders from the Home Secretary to "show no excess zeal in duty." Catholics allege that the police in some cases actually protected mobs who were being repelled by Catholics from Catholic areas.

Thus a religious minority is virtually isolated from the world and deprived of any constitutional means of relief from its sufferings. The Northern Ireland government refused to conduct an inquiry into the riots. The British government, in response to appeals from Belfast Catholics, maintained a "hands-off" policy. Prospects of a united front between Labour and Nationalists are dim, according to labour leaders, because the Catholic hierarchy always support Nationalists as against Labour.

In view of this tragic impasse, and the fact that disturbances have continued sporadically since the July riots, the Catholic Bishop Mageean appealed, in November, to the League of Nations. Whether this move is politic or not, considering the delicate local situation, it is only natural and just. For at a time when the British are proclaiming the importance of the League as a final arbiter of European problems and when their own impotence to deal with Belfast conditions is manifest, they can logically show no objection to an investigation by an impartial international tribunal. Belfast, just as much as Memel, Danzig or the Saar, deserves the attention of Geneva.

HIS NAME IN ENGLISH

Customs Officer (to Chinese immigrant): "What is your name?"
Chinese: "Sneeze."
"Is that your real name?" "No. Me translate it into velly good English."
"Well, what is your native name?" "Ah Choo."—*Japan Times, Tokyo.*

CHURCH SAXOPHONES

Saxophones and trumpets are used during church services in Fresno (California). The parish priest is convinced that the innovation will help to make the service more interesting.—*Pester Lloyd, Budapest.*

HITLER HARMONIES



"Nebelspalter," Switzerland

Religious, racial and political discrimination, they say, has been abolished in Germany—for the period of the Olympic Games.

MULLAHS AND THE MODERN GIRL

A recent series of Young Communist women's conferences throughout the Soviet Union has brought out the strange testimony of how the enslaving of women still persists among backward peoples in the East, encouraged by Mullahs, Mohammadan religious teachers and the church. When a girl delegate from Tashkent failed to appear at a local congress it was found her husband had stabbed and critically wounded her in order to keep her at home. She wrote her report from a hospital bed.

In Kabardino-Balkaria, an autonomous division in the Caucasus, where men start their morning prayers with "O Lord, I thank you that you did not create me a woman," the Mullahs have launched determined opposition to physical culture among young women, especially against the wearing of sport shorts, on the grounds that the laws of Shariat forbids the exposure of women's bodies to men's gaze. Nevertheless, 400 girls in the district are qualified athletes, 120 are sharpshooters and sixteen parachutists.—*Pravda, Moscow.*

AFTER MUSSOLINI

by SIX ANTI-FASCISTS

From the "Boston Evening Transcript," U.S.A.

MANY people are perturbed by the thought that Mussolini's regime may collapse as a result of failure in Ethiopia. They ask : " What next ? " and they answer that a Communist revolution would take place in Italy. This is merely a new version of the old and already exploded myth according to which, thirteen years ago, Mussolini saved Italy, nay Europe, nay more, the whole world, from Bolshevism.

What would really happen in Italy if Mussolini were no longer there ?

A great many things might happen. The least probable of all is a Communist revolution.

Italy is not Russia. Italy is a country predominantly composed of small industrialists, artisans, shopkeepers, professional groups living on a modest scale, and small landowners. There are in Italy 9,600,000 land-tax-paying units. Any government attempting to expropriate the land or shops of these people would soon be brought back to its senses. Furthermore, Italy must import from abroad all kinds of raw materials for her industries and vast quantities of foodstuffs. As soon as a Communist regime would arise in Italy, the capitalists of all the other countries would boycott Italy and the Italian Communistic regime would collapse within a fortnight under the strain of such " sanctions."

The Italian Communists themselves are aware of their inability to bring about a Communist revolution. Only a few weeks ago, at a conference held in Brussels by delegates of Italian anti-Fascist refugees, they declared themselves ready not to oppose the eventual establishment in Italy of a " bourgeois " regime on the condition that it restore political liberties.

On the basis of our observation of the Italian situation, we think that a coalition may be formed under the auspices of the Crown and of the Vatican between some of the Army chiefs, some of the Fascist leaders unfaithful to Mussolini, and some old pre-Fascist politicians, dusted off, brought down from the attic and groomed for the occasion. Such a coalition would rely for support on the regular Army, the Civil Service,

the Police, the Catholic clergy and big business. They would liquidate the Ethiopian War, reinstate representative institutions on the basis of a restricted franchise, restore a very limited degree of political freedom and thus weather the crisis. This coalition might last for a considerable period of time. But it is doubtful whether it could last very long. As soon as the Italians are granted the smallest amount of freedom of speech and of the press, most of them will ask themselves : " What is the use of having a king who has forfeited all sense of honour ? "

The present king has been the accomplice of Mussolini in destroying the Constitution. No sensible Italian can have any confidence either in him or in his prospective successors. Antimonarchist currents will develop. The coalition between Army chiefs, unfaithful Fascists, pre-Fascist politicians, Catholic clergy and big business might prove to be merely a bridge towards an Italian republic. Of course, Italian republicans could not limit their task to the mere formal restoration of personal rights, political liberties and representative institutions. They would have to rebuild the country on the basis of a new economic and social order.

They would place under the control of the community those big industrial concerns which cannot live without tariff protection and government subsidies ; turn over to the tillers of the soil the seventeen million acres of land now belonging to no more than twelve thousand parasitical great landowners ; declare null and void the Lateran agreements of 1929 ; enact a thorough separation of the State from the Church and grant equal and unrestricted liberty to all creeds ; drastically cut military expenses and put into effect a programme of popular education with the greatest possible speed.

If anyone wishes to term this far-reaching change " social revolution," he is entitled to do so, provided he realises that it would not be a " Communist " revolution, but its exact opposite, since it would create in Italy at least two million new small landowners. After all, the big industrial firms would go bankrupt without the support which they receive from the government out of the pockets of the taxpayer, and the great landowners derive little or no income from their estates as a result of thirteen years of Fascist waste and extravagance and nine years of economic depression and unbearable taxation. To deprive these gentlemen of their concerns and their lands would only mean depriving them of a property which could not stand except for governmental support or which has

already been drained of all economic value. Such an Italian democratic republic would again bring Italy within the orbit of the civilised world.

For thirteen years all the conservative forces in Europe and America have given Mussolini the diplomatic, moral and financial support that he needed to strangle the Italian people. Was not the British Government Mussolini's best friend from 1924 to 1934? What did Monsieur Laval do in 1935 if not imitate that policy of close friendship with Mussolini which Sir Austen Chamberlain had inaugurated just after the Matteotti murder and which had been handed down to Arthur Henderson, Sir John Simon and Sir Samuel Hoare? The British people, to be sure, was not responsible for that policy, and as soon as it realised its implications, it ousted Sir Samuel Hoare. Yet, at the moment when the Italian people is the victim of a tragedy for which British and French diplomats and American bankers are as much responsible as Mussolini himself, we find people asking: "Mussolini, and what next?" and proclaiming that Italy could not get along without him.

We always regarded the Fascist rule as inimical to the real welfare of the Italian people and to the peace of the world. Now that the Italian people is confronted with a most dreadful ordeal, and that many of those who were the accomplices of Mussolini's crimes ask: "What next?" we answer: "Italy." We trust in the vitality, moral sanity and common sense of the Italian people. There was an Italy before Mussolini. There will be an Italy after Mussolini—a free Italy within the Commonwealth of Nations.

THE SUPREME VILLAINS

The English count upon our becoming embroiled with Italy, and that they will be definitely master of the Mediterranean. "Divide and rule," is England's motto —one which will never tolerate a serious *rapprochement* between France and Italy, or between France and Germany.—*Gringoire, Paris.*

A LABOUR VIEW OF THE LEAGUE

Whilst I agree with you that it is necessary for us to adhere to the League of Nations today I am somewhat disturbed by the tendency in the Labour Movement to make the League an end in itself rather than an instrument of anti-Fascist policy. . . . At the present moment it is, and can be more so, the rallying ground against Fascist Imperialism. It may have larger possibilities, but these are dependent upon the defeat of Fascism, which is the outstanding issue in international affairs.—*From a letter from "Labour Worker" in the "New Statesman," London.*

"Brennessel," Munich

Otto of Habsburg: "Look at the clock, Mama, and tell me when I am to be Emperor."

Zita: "The clock has stopped, my son!"

NOT WANTED

Prince Starhemberg has had a submarine built for Otto of Habsburg on the Wolfgang Lake. So that he can dive whenever he is not wanted. –"*Brennessel*," *Munich.*

SUDDEN DEATH IN TOKYO ~

JAPAN'S SECRET SOCIETIES

by EDMOND DEMAÎTRE

From "Marianne," Paris

Last month the world was shocked by the assassination of leading members of the Japanese Cabinet, by followers of the Nationalist movement. Here is an account of some of the past activities of the most dreaded of Japan's Secret Societies—the "Blood Brotherhood," which is thought to be responsible for the latest assassinations.

DURING my last visit to Japan, I attended the trial of Lieutenant Innouye, a member of the ultra-nationalist terrorist organisation, the "Blood Brotherhood." Lieutenant Innouye, who had been for several years the head of the Japanese espionage service in China, had entered a religious sect on his return to Japan, and had been very active in several pan-Asiatic organisations. In the dock, the young officer replied to the questions of the judge without a trace of emotion. "We decided to bombard the capital with military aeroplanes borrowed from the aerodrome at Kasumigaura," he declared.

The judges showed no surprise. The president took down a few notes and continued his questions. It looked like a conversation between two well-educated men, each of whom was keenly interested in the affairs of the other. Occasionally it is true the president's voice betrayed a certain indignation, above all when the accused declared that he had intended to kill Prince Saionji, the last of the Elder Statesmen. But when the young officer added that after two days of deliberation the conspirators had decided to strike the name of the old man, who is revered throughout Japan, off the list of the condemned, the judge replied with a gesture that seemed to say: "Very good, my child, that proves your good intentions."

I looked at the public. It was composed of lawyers, soldiers, politicians and journalists. It was clear that they sympathised with the accused, even though they condemned their plans. The thirteen accused realised it. The atmosphere was favourable to them. Their calm and assurance increased.

These thirteen officers, who had intended to kill Prince Saionji, the Keeper of the Privy Seal, the Grand Chamberlain, the Minister of the Palace, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, all belonged to the same secret society, the " Blood Brotherhood." Members of this same society killed Prime Minister Inoukai in 1932, and attempted to kill Baron Wakatsuki, whom they could not forgive for having signed the London naval treaty.

The " Blood Brotherhood " was responsible for the recent massacre in Tokyo. These attacks were not attacks on the Governmental party by the opposition, but on the whole parliamentary system, which, according to the " Blood Brotherhood," sacrifices the military budget to purely political and financial considerations. Neither the members or the leaders of this society have personal ambitions in view. Having got rid of undesirables, they never attempt to take their places.

Aims of the Assassins

The " Blood Brotherhood " is recruited above all from the army. The " Black Dragon " is composed almost entirely of civilians, and above all of university students. But it pursues the same objects with the same means. Both societies aim at seizing power by violence, abolishing the parliamentary system, muzzling the press, instituting a dictatorial government, regulating industry and trade, building a fleet as large as that of England or America, and finally ensuring the political and economic expansion of Japan.

Neither the " Blood Brotherhood " nor the " Black Dragon " can be compared to the Irish secret societies or to the Spanish juntas. They have a horror of publicity. They have neither centre nor newspaper. They never demonstrate. They are organised on the cell system, members are unknown to one another and nobody knows the head of the organisation. Admission is accompanied by extraordinarily severe ceremonies.

Orders are blindly obeyed, cowardice and treason punished by death. That is not to say that the leaders of the societies themselves execute the sentence. Most often they condemn delinquent members to suicide, as was the custom sixty years ago. Such sentences are carried out. Should the police wish to investigate the numerous suicides in Tokyo

during recent years, the best way is to find the political friends and associates of the dead.

THE NOBLE SUICIDE

by TSUNEJIRO AMAKATA

From "The Japan Advertiser," Tokyo

SUICIDE, particularly "Shinju," or love suicide, is a characteristic of Japan which has survived from feudal days. "To settle trouble by death" is a traditional moral viewpoint in Japan. Although the motives and reasons for suicide vary according to individual circumstances, suicide is undoubtedly not to be encouraged as an agreeable way to solve one's mental or economic distress.

"Harakiri," the act of suicide by cutting the abdomen, which was an "honourable act" among Samurai of ancient Japan, is still nowadays regarded by many as a "sacred act" of the Yamato race in accordance with the code of the warrior. It is known that many such suicides have been resorted to by prominent figures in the history of Japan who have rendered meritorious service to the nation or to their feudal lords. Among the outstanding cases was that of the famous Forty-Seven Ronin of Lord Asano, who committed "harakiri" after they had avenged their optional lord.

"Harakiri" is not only a relic of feudal days but is still in usage these days. There is the recent case of the late Major Noboru Kuga, commander of a regiment, who committed suicide in the course of the Shanghai fighting. There was also the case of the "Three Japanese Heroes of Shanghai" in 1932, who dashed to certain death with bombs. Although this case differed from "harakiri" the spirit was the same. It should also be recalled that the late General Nogi, the hero of the Russo-Japanese War, and his wife ended their lives by "harakiri" following the death of Emperor Meiji.

From a nationalistic point of view, "harakiri" is not regarded as mere self-destruction, but is seen as a supreme expression of patriotism. "Regular" suicide, on the other hand, which many Japanese regard as heroic, is self-destruction regardless of the motives.

Many suicides take place annually and the number of suicides has

been increasing enormously, especially since Mount Mihara, the great active volcano on Oshima Island south of Tokyo Bay, has become a popular suicide spot. It is interesting to note that the Kegon Waterfall in Nikko was for many years a favourite place for suicide, but the gaping crater of Mount Mihara has detracted from its popularity.

Regular suicides result mainly from an upset of the nervous system and their causes are naturally laid to various factors, namely physical infirmities, love affairs, poverty, mental derangement, " family troubles " etc. But the predominant motives are of three kinds.

First, feudal morality, which prescribes that " it is not hard to die, but to know how to live well," has been fostered for generations and has become deeply embedded in the national conscience. Consequently, it is interesting to observe that there is a traditional tendency to laud those who elect " to die on the death of their lord and follow him to the other world." Secondly, idealism influenced by Buddhism, that is to say, the idea of being reborn in " paradise " in the next world, has been kept alive. This feeling has been stimulated by song and drama.

Thirdly, unrest and economic distress, are causes of suicides.

It is undeniable that the climate also has much to do with suicide in Japan. The number of suicides rises every year in the hot weather and decreases when it is cool. Thus, the four months of May, June, July and August are called the " suicide season " in this country.

The increasing number of suicides in this country is also attributed to love stories, motion pictures and sentimental popular songs. The Japanese art, as a whole, is highly emotional even though they maintain a shield of inscrutability which Westerners find it difficult to understand.

BRIGHTEN THE RISING SUN

From the " Hokkai Times," Sapporo, Japan

A CERTAIN Japanese has asserted recently that Japan is one of the best countries in the world from the standpoint of peace and order, and that its people find life here pleasant, unlike those of the United States, where life and property are not fully protected. We do not necessarily disagree with this assertion, but it seems to us that there is still much room for improvement. Japan can hardly be said to be the pleasantest possible place in which to live.

In the first place the Japanese are not liberal about freedom of speech. Were they more liberal, daily life would be happier. The law provides such freedom, but the nation is inclined to restrict it. This seems deplorable to us. In European countries and the United States, there is relative, if not perfect, freedom of speech. Many writers and journalists find it possible to take exception to the foreign policies of their countries, and their publics are tolerant of them. What would happen here, though, should we say that China's actions against Japan are not wrong or that what the United States says about Japan is justified? The public turn against us, and our position would be lost under the epithet of traitor or something similar. The people in this country are unable to express freely views for or against the army and the navy. In Western countries, socialism is treated simply as a political matter, with the result that some support it and others reject it. It remains merely political. In Japan, the situation is entirely different. One can hardly sympathise with socialism without being condemned.

Our living conditions are better than those of the Chinese, but they are greatly inferior to those of Europeans and Americans. The United States has about 10,000,000 unemployed; Japan has about a tenth as many. It would be a gross mistake, however, to conclude that living conditions here are better than in that country. Most American workmen own some property and go to work in motorcars. Though thrown out of employment, they do not sink at once. Their existence is well protected by law. Once out of work, a Japanese labourer is driven to the border between life and death. When farmers are overtaken by famine, they are forced to eat even roots and the bark from trees.

As far as freedom of speech is concerned, Great Britain would seem to be the best country in which to live. Anarchists, Communists, atheists and men of other leanings are able to make speeches freely in Hyde Park. The policemen who listen simply smile. For the spending of money, France is the best country in which a man of wealth can live. There, life can be enjoyed to the full. Prices are low, food is good, music and drama are excellent and women are beautiful. For the making of money, the United States stands first. The ideal would be to make money in the United States and spend it in France.

Let us try to make Japan the best country in the world in which to live.

THE FUTURE OF HONG KONG

(Extract from an address by Sir Cecil Clementi, before the Royal Empire Society. The speaker was Governor of Hong Kong for six years.)

Hong Kong is but a dot on the map of China, and yet it is a place of world-wide importance because of its ocean-borne commerce. Moreover, its commercial greatness rests upon the safest and most durable foundations. Nature has endowed it with a priceless asset in its wonderful harbour. British enterprise has developed the potentialities latent in this generous gift of Nature to mankind. Today Hong-Kong is one of the largest shipping centres in the world . . .

Fortunately, this harbour has been placed at the mouth of the West River, which with its tributaries froms the main highway through two Chinese provinces inhabited by teeming millions of a most industrious, capable and peace-loving people, shrewd, daring and upright in their commercial transactions. One of these provinces, Kuang-tung, is by itself as large as Italy and has a somewhat larger population. Canton, its principal city, is less than a hundred miles from Hong-Kong, which is its deep-sea port. This has led to the closest and most friendly co-operation between Hong-Kong and Canton; but recent events have made its maintenance unusually difficult. Civil war has raged in China, almost continuously since the revolution of 1911.

But in 1925 the British Foreign Office clung desperately to the illusion that Peking somehow or other governed all China, though even then it was quite clear that Peking had no control whatever in Kuang-tung. Accordingly, when Sun Yat-sen, who at that time was dominant in Kuang-tung, wished to be friends with Hong Kong and to get help from us, H.M. Government decided that he must be treated as a rebel in arms against Peking and that British help could not be given to Canton . . . Repulsed by us, Sun Yat-sen turned to Russia. Bolshevik intrigue embroiled Canton with Hong Kong. The results to British trade were disastrous, culminating in an intensive boycott which lasted from 1925 to 1928.

We may not have seen the last of trouble such as this ; for, although friendly relations between Hong Kong and Canton were restored in 1928, H.M. Government now recognises Nanking (instead of Peking) as governing *de jure* all China, whereas *de facto* Nanking has effective rule over only some of the Eighteen Provinces, the sphere of its control varying almost from month to month, but not yet including Canton. Therefore, I most earnestly hope that we may take warning by the past and not again sacrifice Hong Kong to an illusion—the illusion this time that Nanking governs Kuang-tung, if in fact it does not. Hong Kong is the most valuable British asset in China and British foreign policy in China ought, therefore, largely to be based upon the needs of Hong Kong . . .

A solution must be found for three other problems . . .

Hong Kong has admirable oversea connections with China and, indeed, with the whole world. But her overland commerce suffers from the serious disability that the Kowloon-Canton railway has not yet been connected with the Canton-Hankow railway. There is a missing link of some five miles which ought to be forged without delay. The Canton-Hankow railway connects with the Hankow-Peking railway, which in turn connects with the Manchurian and Trans-Siberian lines, and so with Europe and the English Channel . . .

The second problem which needs early solution concerns the customs barriers between Hong Kong and the province of Kuang-tung. The Colony of Hong Kong is, and always has been, devoted to free trade. China, on the contrary, subjects all imports and exports to an elaborate tariff. Now the Chinese Customs authorities have always complained that the free trade policy of Hong-Kong results in the Colony being made an entrepôt for smuggling to China in general, and to the province of Kuang-tung in particular . . . It is most desirable that a customs agreement should be made between Hong Kong and Canton, where under duties upon goods destined for China could be collected in the Colony, which would serve as a bonded warehouse for the storage of such goods until they were despatched to their Chinese market. In return for such a valuable concession by the Government of Hong Kong, it would be reasonable to stipulate that the Chinese restrictions upon foreign trade in the inland waterways of the West River and its delta should be relaxed in favour of the Colony's junk and launch traffic . . .

Thirdly and lastly, I come to the gravest of all the problems which confront Hong Kong as a dependency of the British Empire. The

island of Hong Kong (32 square miles) was ceded by China to Great Britain in perpetuity by the treaty of Nanking in 1842 ; and by the Convention of Peking in 1860 China further ceded to Great Britain in perpetuity the tip of the Kowloon peninsula ($2\frac{2}{3}$ square miles). Now the harbour of Hong Kong, which is the great asset of the Colony, is embraced on its southern side by the island of Hong Kong and on its northern side by the mainland. The line of the mainland approaches the island very closely at the eastern end of the harbour, where the exit to the open sea is the famous Lyeemun Pass, a channel not more than half a mile in width, but deep enough to permit the passage of the largest ocean-going steamers. At its western end the harbour is sheltered by a number of other islands, of which the largest is Lantao. The area of the whole harbour is about ten square miles, and all of it is dominated by the hill ranges of the mainland. This situation caused serious anxiety to those concerned with the administration and defence of Hong Kong, for the harbour was indefensible while the Kowloon hill range was not in British hands, and the policing of the harbour was very difficult so long as part of its waters was under British and part under Chinese control. Accordingly, after protracted negotiation with the Chinese Government, a convention was signed at Peking on June 9, 1898, by which Great Britain obtained on lease from China for ninety-nine years the whole of the Kowloon peninsula from Deep Bay to Mirs Bay, including the waters of those two bays and all the islands therein. Thus 359 square miles were added to the Colony's previous area of $34\frac{2}{3}$ square miles . . .

If, however, at the end of this century the British lease of the New Territory is allowed to expire, let no one suppose that it would be possible to revert to the state of things which obtained prior to 1898. Hong Kong and Kowloon have now become indissolubly one. The whole of Kowloon peninsula has now become one large city, destined to outdo the island in size and commercial importance . . . Nor could the naval establishments and the naval dry-dock and camber in Hong Kong be defended, if the New Territory were not in British hands. Either, therefore, the New Territory must remain British in perpetuity like the original Colony, or the Colony itself will have to be given back to China. I can see no other solutions. As I cannot believe that the British Empire will ever acquiesce in the retrocession of Hong Kong to China, it behoves us to offer (the sooner the better,) terms upon which the Chinese can honourably agree to the cession of the New Territory in perpetuity to Great Britain.

Briefly, the outlook is this : if the British Empire is firmly resolved to retain possession of Hong Kong, which means possession of the New Territory as well, and if British power on sea, on land and in the air, is strong enough to make British policy respected in the Far East, then the future prosperity of Hong Kong as a British Colony and of British trade with China is assured. But if there should be irresolution in this matter, and if there should arise a doubt in the Far East as to whether Great Britain has the strength necessary to implement her policy and safeguard her possessions, then the future of Hong Kong will be beset with many and grave dangers, increasing as the end of this century approaches, and there is serious risk that this Colony and the China trade may be lost to the British Empire . . .

CHINA ANSWERS BACK

by "JUNIUS SINICUS"

From "The People's Tribune," Shanghai

To Sir Cecil Clementi, London

In an address to the Royal Empire Society, you described Hongkong as the most valuable British asset in China, and said that British policy in China ought, therefore, to be largely based on the needs of Hongkong.....

As you very poetically put it, Nature herself has dictated very close, intimate, and friendly co-operation between Hongkong, Canton, and the teeming millions of Kwangtung—leaving your spell-bound listeners at the Royal Empire Society luncheon to infer that Nature herself has also dictated that Great Britain should be for all time the doorkeeper at this gateway to South China. As a matter of fact, it was the policy of your own Government which led to Hongkong being torn away from its natural setting, and in defiance of what you would call Nature's dictate the island was wrested from China and made part of that great overseas empire of which you are so proud. We may agree that there should be close, intimate and friendly co-operation between Hongkong and Canton, and the only thing which is calculated to make that highly desirable state of affairs difficult of attainment is the fact that Hongkong is British and Canton is Chinese—and *that* is certainly not in accordance with the "dictate" of Nature, yet it is your idea that another 359 square miles

of Chinese territory should be made British for all time! It suits you to regard Hongkong as "the most valuable British asset in China," which no doubt it is, but it evidently does not occur to you that this "asset" rightly belongs to Kwangtung and its most industrious, most capable, and most peace-loving people—as you now profess to regard them—"shrewd, daring, and upright in their commercial transactions." Nor does it occur to you that continued retention of Hongkong and the leased territory in the hands of a foreign nation (even so friendly a one as Great Britain is today) is not considered even by the people of Kwangtung as being in accord with the dictate of Nature.

You are greatly concerned about the future of that Chinese territory on the mainland which has been leased to Great Britain for 99 years, and possession of which is due to be surrendered in 1997. You are quoted as saying that either "the New Territory must remain British in perpetuity, like the original Colony, or the Colony itself will have to be given back to China. I can see no other solution." Since you are convinced that the British Empire will never agree to give Hongkong back to its original and rightful owners, you suggest "that as soon as there exists a Government which has *de facto* rights as well as *de jure* control over the province of Kwangtung . . . a Government which is able to 'deliver the goods'"; Great Britain should negotiate a comprehensive settlement of this issue. It appears there are "many things that the Cantonese would like to obtain," though you do not enumerate them, and you suggest that Britain—in return for these unnamed favours—should demand the cession in perpetuity of 359 square miles of Chinese territory in addition to the 35 already taken from China, inland navigation rights, linking of the Canton-Kowloon railway with the line which will connect Canton with Hankow, and facilities for air-transport between Hongkong and other cities in China. I must say this is an exceedingly modest price to ask the Chinese people to pay—not for the return of their island of Hongkong, but for the surrender of another 359 square miles of their territory! Yours would be a hard bargain, Sir Cecil—the sort of deal which is not usually associated with Great Britain nowadays, but is reminiscent of the demands made upon China by a certain neighbouring country which shall be nameless.

It would seem that what is really on your mind is the possibility of the situation in 1997 being as it was in 1898—and even more so. It was because your military men pretended that it would be unsafe for

British subjects and property to be exposed to the risk of artillery-fire from the hills behind the strip along the Kowloon foreshore that application was made to China for a lease to the British Government of the area which includes those heights. This was done long before any of us imagined anything like bomb-dropping aeroplanes buzzing about over our heads, and command of the hilltops behind Kowloon no longer gives the feeling of security it used to. Moreover, you point out that uncertainty about the future of this leased territory is already impeding the progress of development, hence your desire to see this question decided by the land being made British "in perpetuity," the alternative being for John Bull to pack up and leave Hongkong, Kowloon and the New Territory to those to whom—borrowing your phrase—Nature dictated it should belong.

But you are not in favour of so drastic a step, and have no intention of surrendering "the most valuable British asset in China." On the contrary you would like to see it rendered "impregnable"—another Gibraltar, in short—and you want to consolidate your economic position (I use the personal pronoun impersonally), by linking the British "possession" with the Canton-Hankow railway, thereby scotching Chinese plans for developing Canton as a world-trade centre. You very boldly declare that "Canton is not and never can be a deep-sea port," the wish—no doubt—being father to the thought. Fifty years ago there were people who said that Shanghai would never become a great shipping centre, and that the river would be silted up to such an extent that deep-sea vessels could not enter it. I am inclined to believe that your prophecy concerning Canton will prove equally false—but even assuming it is fulfilled, is that any reason why your Cantonese friends, for whom you profess to have such deep affection, should welcome the prospect of their oversea trade being handled in perpetuity at a British port? If Canton is—as you suggest—doomed not to develop its port facilities, is this not all the more reason for its citizens desiring to recover the territory taken and/or leased from them?—territory used not only for shipping and industrial purposes, but as a base for British naval, military, and air forces. You were kind enough to tell the members of the Royal Empire Society that it is an illusion to imagine that Nanking governs Kwangtung, but you are under a still greater illusion if you imagine that China will agree to make a gift of 359 square miles of territory even to so friendly a nation as yours on such terms as you suggest,

and which you are naïve enough to regard as being inspired by feelings of generosity and goodwill toward China.

CHINA LOOKS TO BRITAIN

From the "Asahi," Osaka, Japan

ANGLO-JAPANESE relations in China are very delicate. In 1934, however, Britain advised the Nanking Government to liquidate its feud with Japan before seeking British financial assistance. This is said to have induced Nanking to assume a more friendly attitude toward this country in the early part of 1935. China always pays great attention to what the Powers think about Sino-Japanese relations, especially Great Britain and the United States, and its political leaders are easily influenced by their opinions in shaping their policy toward Japan. If Great Britain says that Sino-Japanese amity is necessary, China will tend to bring about amity. If Britain assails Japan or moves to check its advance on the continent an anti-Japanese atmosphere can be expected in China, probably in the shape of student agitation. This requires close watching by those responsible for Japan's policy toward China.

The Nanking Government insists that it realises the need for adjustment of Sino-Japanese relations with Japan. In this, it is rather abstract, but we suppose that what China needs most is stabilisation of the North China situation and moral or material support from Japan for its new currency system. For Japan to satisfy Nanking's desires will be extremely difficult, for Japan looks at things in one way and China in another. It can lead the situation to its advantage only by utilising Britain's influence on China. This makes Anglo-Japanese co-operation of great importance at this moment.

Be that as it may, the Foreign Office should concentrate on adjustment of Anglo-Japanese economic relations. The Japanese-Egyptian, Japanese-Australian and Indo-Japanese trade negotiations are primarily aimed at this objective, for Egypt, Australia and India are within the British sphere of influence. The Dutch East Indies belong to Holland, but it cannot be denied that British influence is strong there and that the views of the Dutch authorities are often coloured by what the British think. Trade with all of these countries bears on British interests and, Japan cannot easily conclude satisfactory agreements with them if its interests clash with those of Britain.

TERROR OF THE "OUTBACK" GOES

by E. McLOUGHLIN

From the "Argus," Melbourne

THE first chapter of the story begins nearly thirty years ago, when a young missionary became an actor in the drama played on the vast stage of the Central Australian desert, and saw in its tragic lines the theme of his life work. The second chapter, a tale of incessant labour, hope, and disappointment, ends in triumph in 1928. The third chapter is still being written. It is a happy chapter, in which a young man who dreamed great dreams has lived to see them become great realities.

The man is the Rev. John Flynn, "Flynn of the Inland," pioneer of aerial medical services and friend of every pioneer who has made his life in Australia's vast empty spaces. When Flynn went into the "Never Never" fear of illness or injury had a real terror. There was little hope of aid. He saw men and women die needlessly. He saw children maimed for lack of medical skill.

The country's only link with the outside world was the overland telegraph line, stretching 2,000 miles from Darwin to Adelaide. Flynn talked to the operators at lonely telegraph stations. They told him tales of how men had ridden to them across hundreds of miles of desert for medical advice for a sick wife, son, or mate. They told him how they had tapped out a message to Adelaide and how a doctor 1,000 miles away had prescribed by telegram for a patient he had never seen. Flynn talked to the settlers. They told him of their constant fear—"if the wife gets sick." They told him of the agonies which men with broken limbs had suffered in ten, or perhaps twenty, days' journey across trackless and waterless country to the northerly railhead of Oodnadatta to begin a 600-mile journey by rail to the nearest hospital.

Flynn painted these pictures in a report to the Australian Inland Mission. He was called to Sydney, and submitted a plan of hospital building. Each hospital was to serve a circular area with a radius of 300 miles, and each circle was to overlap. These circles covered all inland Australia except Arnhem Land and a part of the wild north-west of Cape York, where no white man lived. But even then, in 1913, Flynn believed that this was only the framework on which to build his great conception—an aerial medical service. The war came. It interfered

with his project, but its development of aviation brought his plan of " flying doctors " nearer, and at last it became a reality. The first service began to operate in 1928 from the Cloncurry (Q) base hospital, and since then two more services have been established.

Many problems had to be overcome, and the greatest was finding a simple means of communication. Wireless was the obvious method, but there were obstacles in the way—lack of skilled operators in small settlements, lack of electric power, and expense. Flynn was not dismayed. He felt that there was some way out. And there was. Mr. Alfred Traeger, a young man with a genius for wireless, found it after years of experimenting and many disappointments. The wireless set had to be simple, light, and inexpensive. Traeger created a miniature wireless station equipped to send and receive, the power for which was derived from a generator driven by bicycle pedals pushed by the operator. The first sets transmitted Morse by key. There were disadvantages in this. Traeger was not satisfied. He continued his experiments until he had evolved probably the most novel wireless transmitting set in the world. It has the keyboard of a typewriter, and pressure on any one of the letter keys sends the Morse signal for that letter. For short distances two-way wireless telephony is possible. Gradually, a network is being built, linking the far distant places, through " mother " stations, with the outside.

Here is a story in the case-book of Queensland's " flying doctor." Gordon, aged six years, at Lorraine cattle station, 126 miles from Cloncurry, became ill. An epidemic of infantile paralysis was raging in Queensland. The child tossed and turned feverishly in his bed all night, watched by his anxious mother. The nearest doctor was 126 miles away, and a few years ago would have been as inaccessible as if he had been a thousand. The pedal set has changed that. Morning had hardly broken before the mother had the set tuned up and waiting. At last came the daily call : " Cloncurry calling. Good morning. Has anyone any urgent messages ? " The mother could not remember that that voice was also speaking to Milingimbi Island, 700 miles to the north ; Hermannsburg, 700 miles to the west ; Birdsville and Innamincka, away to the south ; and a score of other places. That morning the message was for her alone. At last came the operator's voice : " It's over to you," and the mother hurriedly moved the switch to the sending side of her instrument. " 8VX—8VX—8VX," she tapped out. " I have an urgent

message for the doctor. Child, aged six, feverish, sore back. Could it be infantile paralysis ? " Quickly she switched to the receiving side. " Just one minute 8VX," came the operator's reply. " I'll get Doctor Vickers."

The doctor spoke, calm and reassuring. He asked questions. " It sounds like infantile paralysis," he said. " I have some serum. I'll be out at 11, and if necessary bring you and the boy back." Three hours later the doctor was at the bedside. It was infantile paralysis. Serum was administered and in a few hours the 'plane was back at Cloncurry and the boy in hospital. He recovered and in a few months was back at his home, a normal, healthy child. Once again the " flying doctor " had defeated death.

The Cloncurry doctor, on an average, flies 20,000 miles a year, and attends directly to about 250 patients. His 'plane, with its enclosed cabin, built to carry a patient on a stretcher, is his ambulance. Sometimes he does not have to use it. Advice by wireless is sufficient to meet the situation. His average for these cases is about one hundred a year.

In a few years there will be no part of Australia outside the " mantle of safety " envisaged by a country minister nearly thirty years ago.

THE CITIZEN THAT KNEW

Why bother to write jokes when one can get a dialogue like the following, overheard at the Bureau of Naturalization ?

" Where is Washington ? "

" He's dead."

" I mean the Capital of the United States."

" Oh, they loaned it all to Europe."

" Do you promise to support the Constitution ? "

" Me—how can I ? I have a wife and six children to support."—*Western Truck Owner, U.S.*

FASHIONS MAKE A HEALTHY CONGO

Fashions have helped the Belgian Congo to defeat malaria. Snake leather is in great demand and the natives breed these snakes in greater quantities. The snakes eat a certain kind of fish which is also bred for this purpose. These fish in their turn consume greater quantities of the eggs of the insects which carry the malaria bacillus.—*Baseler Nachrichten, Basle.*

THE MECHANISED BEE

At its experimental laboratory at Somerset, Maryland, bee specialists are trying to produce a honey bee with " larger cargo space and greater wing spread."—*Japan Times, Tokyo.*

ENGLAND SAYS ~

So many of our readers live abroad that we shall print extracts from the English periodicals for their benefit.

EGYPT'S OPPORTUNITY

LAST month the Anglo-Egyptian conversations for the settlement of questions outstanding between the two countries began in Cairo. *The Round Table*, (a quarterly review of the politics of the British Commonwealth) gives a lucid account of the " background of negotiation."

> On February 28, 1922, the British protectorate over Egypt was terminated by a declaration that Egypt was an independent Sovereign State. The British Government qualified its declaration by " absolutely reserving " to itself, pending conclusion of agreements with the Egyptian Government, the following matters:
>
> (*a*) The security of the communications of the British Empire in Egypt;
>
> (*b*) The defence of Egypt against all foreign aggression or interference, direct or indirect;
>
> (*c*) The protection of foreign interests in Egypt and the protection of minorities;
>
> (*d*) The Sudan.

The history of Egyptian politics since 1922 is largely the story of attempts to reconcile sovereign independence with the formidable and elastic reservations attached to the 1922 grant. The Wafd (" Wafd " is an Arabic word meaning " delegation "), which is the political organisation supporting complete independence, has untiringly worked for this end. It aims to increase the legislature at the expense of the royal prerogative and to imbue the civil service with Wafdist ideas.

A draft treaty in 1930 was never signed, and the present political movement in Egypt is based largely on a demand for its immediate signature, and for the restoration of the 1923 Constitution. The chief provisions of the draft treaty were:

1. Termination of British military occupation of Egypt.
2. Egypt to join the League of Nations.
3. The Egyptian Government to assume entire responsibility for lives and property of foreigners in Egypt.
4. An alliance to be concluded between the two Governments.
5. Mutual assistance should either country be involved in war.
6. Differences regarding the execution of the treaty, which could not be settled by direct negotiation, to be dealt with in accordance with the Covenant of the League of Nations.

7. Great Britain to persuade Powers possessing capitulatory rights in Egypt to agree to the transference to the Mixed Tribunals of the jurisdiction of Consular Courts, and to the application of Egyptian law to foreigners.

8. British forces up to a total of 11,000 to be stationed in the neighbourhood of Ismailia on the Suez Canal. This clause to be reconsidered at the end of twenty years.

Negotiations have been made more difficult by the reaction of the Wafdists to Sir Samuel Hoare's speech of November 9, 1935, in which he stated the British Government's view that the 1923 Constitution was not suited to Egypt's needs, and by the Abyssinian crisis.

Egyptian sympathies were wholly with Great Britain in her attitude towards the Italo-Ethiopian conflict. At the same time Egypt was determined to use that dispute and Great Britain's evident need of Egyptian cooperation in naval and military precautions to secure from the British Government recognition of Egypt's right to complete independence. For years past the Wafd's leaders have made no secret of their aims. " We are powerless," they said, " to force Great Britain to accept our claims until some other more powerful factor than our agitation brings influence to bear on the British Government. But once let Great Britain become involved in a European situation that will make security for British communications in Egypt a paramount consideration, and we will use that situation to exact compliance with our demands."

Great Britain's Worry

Writing on " Great Britain and Egypt " in the *Contemporary Review*, Mr. Arthur Merton covers the same ground, and discusses the chief problems to be faced by the negotiators—the military clauses, public security in the interior, and the Sudan.

Reduced to its simplest expression the military problem poses itself as follows : Egypt's position is an exceedingly vulnerable one. It must be adequately defended. Egypt can raise and maintain an army very considerably larger and better equipped than her present forces. While this will severely tax her budget it will also take some time to organise. In any case it would never be adequate for her defence. Were it not for her geographical position and the menace to British Imperial interests which the presence of any foreign Power in Egypt would represent, we should not trouble ourselves much whether she was able or not to maintain her territorial integrity. But, given the vital link Egypt now constitutes not only in the chain of Imperial communications but also in the maintenance of world peace and the balance of power in the Mediterranean, Great Britain cannot be indifferent to any threat to the existence of Egypt as an independent sovereign state. So much being admitted, there should be no inherent difficulty in finding a formula which, while respecting Egypt's rights and providing for cooperation with her forces, would enable Great Britain at all times to take all measures she may deem necessary

in a matter in which Egypt herself has such a fundamental interest. Egyptians object that the presence of British troops in their cities and of a British element in their police infringes their independence. But it should be from the angle of the maintenance of world peace and her contribution thereto that Egypt should regard any concession which she may be called upon to make in regard to the aspirations she so legitimately cherishes.

Where to hitch our waggon

Soviet Russia is an important factor in " Anglo-Japanese Relations," which is the title of an article by Colonel John C. Somerville in the *Empire Review*. The author was formerly Military Attaché, British Embassy, Tokyo. Japan, he says, desires to establish a buffer state to protect Korea, and ultimately herself, from Russia. The Soviet army, in man power and efficiency, is formidable.

> The possibility, therefore, of a Japanese defeat, however unlikely it may appear in the light of history, has to be envisaged ; and in this event, what would be the sequel ? It would obviously be that Russia would have the ball at her feet in China—an unhindered course for the propagation of communism, the original germs of which were inoculated into the body politic by Borodin and are still flourishing sporadically. Outer Mongolia is already to a large extent sovietized ; and without the prophylactic barrier maintained by Japan, there would be nothing to prevent the infection from spreading into Manchukuo and North China, and thence eventually southwards, till China became " Red " throughout. And there would be none to stop it.....

Japan must have an outlet for her increasing population, and markets for her modern industry. Colonel Somerville advises us to recognise Manchukuo, even at the cost of losing a certain amount of " face," and to reestablish the " old friendly feeling that united us in the days of the alliance." For there is a rumour of another alliance, which might not be to our advantage.

> There is a considerable weight of pro-German feeling both in the Army and the learned professions ; and policy—foreign policy in particular—is largely dictated by the former, so that it would not be altogether surprising if there were some substance in the rumour. If so, what reply could we make to it ? The hermit-crab policy of the United States since the war has demonstrated the hopelessness of attempting the conclusion of any hard and fast agreement with her, and the overwhelming bulk of public opinion in this country would oppose any suggestion of one with the Soviet—the only other people whose help in the East would be of any value. Unless, therefore, we are going to allow our commitments in the East and our Dominions in the Pacific to remain hopelessly in pawn, it seems to me that the only sound policy for us is to hitch our wagon again, not to a star, or even to a constellation of nations, but to the Rising Sun.

BOLSHEVIK UNREST IN INDIA



Gulbransson, "Simplicissimus," Munich.

1 2 John Bull: "Excuse me, Mr. Litvinov, something's biting me!"

G

RHODESIAN GRANDEUR AND MYSTERY

THE lamentable state of affairs in Europe will no doubt turn travellers to thoughts of other continents this year. " Darkest Africa " in fact seems a haven of light and peace, except for the corner in which Mussolini continues his war on Ethiopians. For that reason the following notes on Southern Rhodesia may be of interest to a number of people who normally do not go so far afield in their wanderings.

The North American Continent can usually claim to have the largest in the world, whether of skyscrapers or natural phenomena, but the Niagara Falls must take second place in comparison with the Victoria Falls—Rhodesia's greatest wonder —which are nearly two and a half times as high as Niagara, and nearly twice as wide along the lip. Londoners at least may gain some idea of their vastness, by being told that their height is slightly more than that of St. Paul's, and their width about equal to the distance from the British Museum to Marble Arch. These are, however, meaningless comparisons only of interest to the academic mind, since they in reality convey nothing to the imagination of the stupendous grandeur of the " Smoke that Thunders." More vivid is the fact that the noise of the falling water can be heard at flood time for a distance of ten miles.

From the Falls many excursions may be made. The most popular is one by launch or native-paddled canoe to Kandahar Island through very beautiful scenery. palm-studded islands are passed, all intersected by " lanes " made by hippo in going to or from the water.

Other excursions are to Palm Grove, with its riot of tropical growth ; and Livingstone Island, from which there are magnificent views of the Chasm and of the Rainbow and Main Falls. In the season flowering orchids are to be seen on some of the trees. At the very edge of the precipice is the rock on which Livingstone lay to peer into the abyss below. The tree on which he carved his initials is still standing, though the carving is now exceedingly faint. No visit to Southern Rhodesia moreover, would be completc without a pilgrimage to the Matopo Hills, on the summit of which, known as the " View of the World," lie the remains of the Empire Builder, Cecil Rhodes.

Then there are the mysterious ruins of Zimbabwe whose origin still baffle scientists. Years of investigation have so far brought no reliable explanation of the origin of what must once have been a city with a culture far beyond that of the present-day natives.

The most romantic theory is that of the German scientist, Professor Frobenius, who maintains that the ruins are the last relics of an amazing and unknown empire, dating back some 3,000 years, which extended over a large area of South Africa and was ruled by red men from the neighbourhood of the Persian Gulf.

An elliptical temple 830 feet in circumference is the most spectacular of the Zimbabwe ruins. At one end is a sacred enclosure containing a large solid cone

which, together with a platform remains unexplained, although they were certainly used in the practice of some forgotten religious cult.

On the outer wall of the temple is a herring bone decoration, one of the oldest patterns in the world. It is the symbol for water, the Zodiacal sign for Aquarius and a symbol of fertility. The part of the temple decorated with it is that upon which the sun shines when rising at the summer solstice, a fact which again suggests an ancient religious ceremony.

The winter, *i.e.*, our European summer, is the best time for visiting Rhodesia. April to October are the months recommended for a trip to Zimbabwe and the Victoria Falls.

DIESEL OR PETROL?

by CAPTAIN G. E. T. EYSTON
The famous Racing Motorist.

A NOVELTY at the recent Berlin Motor Show which to me appeared specially significant was a new diesel car with a four-cylinder engine that came almost within the light-car classification.

For heavy vehicles, buses, lorries and the like, the diesel engine, consuming heavy oil instead of petrol, is well established. At our own Commercial Motor Show at Olympia last autumn one vehicle in every four was driven by oil, while fifty per cent. of the vehicles shown could be bought with diesel or petrol engines, as desired.

It is well known that many more diesel driven buses are being built for London where it may be only a matter of time before diesel traction is universal.

Designers, however, who have attempted to develop lighter diesel engines for private cars have always been faced with two very serious problems. They have had in the first place to pare down weight, while at the same time allowing for the greater strength demanded of high compression engines, and in the second place they have had to ensure even distribution of the minute quantities of fuel required in a small engine. I shall therefore watch the development of this German light diesel engine with some interest.

Why diesel ? Since I first set up what were then unofficial world records for diesel engined cars at Brooklands in 1933, I may claim to have taken some part in the development of the diesel engine, both for private cars as well as commercial vehicles, and it is only a few weeks since, following the official international recognition of diesel records, I and my fellow-driver, A. Denly, put up a 24-hour long distance record in this class at Montlhéry, in a four-seater streamlined saloon with a six-cylinder diesel engine similar in every respect to the engines that are installed in hundreds of London buses.

Put briefly, the claims for the diesel engine are that it is cheaper to run, simpler and safer than a petrol driven unit of corresponding power.

Fuel economy is the diesel engine's biggest "selling point." Diesel engines will give very nearly double the mileage per gallon, while diesel fuel, including tax, costs very considerably less than first quality petrol.

In a test run of two hundred miles, including a stiff mountain section in Wales, a large sports car with a powerful four-cylinder diesel engine gave an average fuel consumption of very nearly forty-three miles to the gallon for the entire trip.

This equals the fuel economy of the smallest baby car, although the sports car had an engine which was, in fact, more than four times as big.

My own diesel saloon, in spite of the fact that it is used for record-breaking, is so light on fuel that it will carry enough in the tank for the run from London to Edinburgh and back—in other words, eight hundred miles on one tankful.

Apart from the saving in cost, fuel economy may prove of enormous value in long distance flying.

One of the greatest difficulties in the way of air services across the North Atlantic is this very problem of fuel consumption. With petrol, the quantity and weight necessary for long "hops" over the sea seriously reduces the possible "pay load," while a further problem is to get the overloaded machine off the ground at all.

Both problems may be solved by the substitution of diesel for petrol engines, since although, gallon for gallon, diesel fuel is heavier than petrol, so much less is needed that there is a very considerable net saving in weight.

A feature of the diesel engine that will appeal with special force to ordinary motorists is its simplicity. Ignition troubles are eliminated, since the mixture is fired by compression alone. Further, the engine requires no carburetter.

By no means least among the merits of the diesel engine is its virtual immunity from fire. On the road this is a factor which cannot be ignored, remote though the risk of fire may be. In the air it is of such incalculable importance as almost to justify the adoption of the diesel engine on his score alone.

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

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GRAMOPHONE NOTES

For the benefit of those of our readers living in the more remote parts of the world, we shall continue to publish occasionally notes on good music records.

TOPICALITY has a value even on the gramophone and the recording companies are showing more and more a disposition to issue works that a notable concert performance has left still fresh in the public memory. A recent topical work is William Walton's new symphony, which appears in full from Decca, on six 5*s*. records. The Queen's Hall premiere of this was one of the high lights of the winter concert season in London ; and though its tortured music may not earn for it a very high place say one hundred years hence, every intelligent musician appreciates what an important stage it marks in the development of a composer who will do much greater things yet.

Less ambitious issues that I have heard and liked recently, include a new " Treasury of Music " record (T. 9), which is a *Sonata di Camera* by Vivaldi in eight short movements ; so many performers nowadays seem to think that a classical sonata cannot possibly be romantic and rest content with a mere rendering of the notes, that it is a particular pleasure to listen to the exquisite phrasing and finish of this anonymous French quartette. On a record from the German Telefunken Company (A. 1900), Aulikki Rantawaara, the Finnish mezzo who has been heard at Glyndebourne during the last two seasons, sings two famous Sibelius songs, " Der erste Kuss " and " Mädchen kam von Stelldichein " (commonly known in English as " The Tryst "). This is a miracle of clarity in recording. The E.M.G. Company hold stocks in London of both the above records. M. H. McD.

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INTERNATIONAL BOOKSHELF

The Editor reminds his readers that he does not necessarily share the opinions expressed by reviewers in this section. But this is a free country and knows no censorship.

HITLER'S RISE TO POWER

HITLER. A Biography. By Konrad Heiden. *Constable.* 10*s.*

This book, by the author of the well-known *History of National Socialism*, comes as near being a definitive biography of Herr Hitler as we have had in English. It is also, like its predecessor, one of the most informative books on the whole spectacle and menace of German Fascism that has yet appeared. Mr. Heiden, to my mind, is rigorously impartial, but impartiality in certain circumstances is tantamount to an indictment, and no one who has read this book can fail to realise Hitler's wayward but predictable dangerousness.

Mr. Heiden's biography begins with a brief study of Hitler's origins ; it proceeds to an excellent account of the 1923 Munich Putsch ; it studies Hitler's subsequent " seven years on the Magic Mountain " (Berchtesgaden) ; it attempts to unravel the tangled story of the Papen-Schleicher conspiracies around Hindenburg ; it ends with a terrifying account of the bloodbath of June 30.

Mr. Heiden himself, I have been told, was a Nazi in the very early days of the movement, and his position as correspondent in Munich of the *Frankfurter Zeitung* gave him unexampled opportunity to see the beginnings of Hitlerism from the " inside." The early chapters are, perhaps, the best in the book, because they describe events and circumstances that for years have been wrapt in comparative mystery.

Hitler would not have reached power maybe, except for the stimulus of Eckart's friendship ; he would not have reached power except for financial aid from the Reichswehr ; he would not have reached power except for the organising genius of his best friend (whom he was to shoot many years later) Ernst Roehm. All this Heiden points out. He also points out that Hitler, the product of many forces, was a tremendous force himself. He does not underestimate Hitler's personal qualities. And these are portrayed against an authentic background of the Germany of 1919-23, sullen, yearning, passionately powerful through realisation of its own tortured weakness.

There are many details in Heiden's book quite new to me ; for instance the fact that for some years Hitler wore a beard. An example of the author's political discernment is the following :

> " The great modern mass parties, first and foremost the Fascist, have re-discovered an old historical truth which seemed long since buried ; that men often and masses almost always, pay service not to their interests but to their illusions."

I am a little sceptical of the details of some of Hitler's alleged love-affairs.

Since this book was published Hitler has made the supreme gesture of his extraordinarily bizarre life—he has torn up the Locarno treaty and sent his troops into the demilitarized Rhineland. No one could do better than read Heiden's book for insight in the mind of the man who produced the gravest European crisis since 1914.

JOHN GUNTHER.

DECLINE AND FALL OF A DEMOCRACY

A HISTORY OF THE GERMAN REPUBLIC. By Arthur Rosenberg. *Methuen.* 15*s.*

Herr Rosenberg is a Socialist, an emigrant, and—I think—a "non-Aryan." He has written his book in exile. But it is not an "emigrant" production. It has no trace of the bitterness, the peevish recrimination and futile propaganda which has poured out from the printing-presses of Prague and Zurich, Vienna, New York and—London.

Here is at last a balanced, scholarly work, dealing, it is true, with highly controversial matter from the Socialist point of view, but without dogmatism : in short, a genuine "History" of the Weimar Republic written by a historian. I have only one grievance, and that a serious one—the book was not available when I was struggling to write about the tangled events in post-war Germany.

Practically half of the book deals with the events of eighteen months, from November, 1918, to the failure of the Kapp Putsch early in 1920. For Herr Rosenberg believes—and I think rightly—that those months sealed the fate of the Republic. They saw the fatal split between the Majority and Independent Social Democrats, the liquidation of the Workers' and Soldiers' Councils—which Herr Rosenberg believes might have been made into an organ of moderate Socialist democracy—the failure to make any real move in the direction of Socialism, or even social control, the confirmation of the great bureaucracy in their posts, the futile Soviet Republic in Munich and the complete victory of counter-revolution in Bavaria. And above all they saw the Social Democrats appealing not merely to the Generals but to the most reactionary of the armed forces to maintain order—to those very Free Corps who marched against them under Kapp and out of whom the Nazi Storm Troops ultimately evolved.

Herr Rosenberg maintains that the democratic Government troops could have put down the Spartirst rising in January, 1919, without the Free Corps, and that they might then have become the nucleus of a republican army. The point is fundamental. The Social Democrat, Noske, who was chiefly responsible, maintained that the various democratic formations were always talking when they were wanted to fight. But whatever the truth may be, Social Democracy failed in its handling of military affairs—and there are none more vital. The great decisions of history seem unfortunately to depend upon who can shoot, and above all get others to shoot.

Then, again, the Socialists and Republicans generally need never have allowed the Right to get away with a monopoly of nationalism. The counter-revolutionaries needed peace just as much. But they were allowed to use the whole nation against the Treaty of Versailles for their own purposes. However, Herr Rosenberg stresses the point that it was the economic crisis rather than a sense of national humiliation which produced National Socialism—Hitler had no real successes till 1930.

The same year saw the end of the Republic. Since October, 18, 1930, when

the Reichstag allowed Brüning's unconstitutional emergency decrees to pass unchallenged and undiscussed " one dictatorship has succeeded to another in Germany."

H. Powys Greenwood.

CYCLING THROUGH HISTORY

FAREWELL TO REVOLUTION. By Everett Dean Martin. *Routledge.* 12*s.* 6*d.*

It is rather difficult to understand just what Mr. Martin had in mind when he wrote this book. Lord Lothian's preface does not make the position clearer. The latter explains that revolutions are never popular, but are the work of desperate factions who play upon mass passion and then surrender to crowd psychology, and that the hallmark of a revolution is the use " of economic conflicts and political issues as rationalisations and justifications for abandoning the attempt to progress by the patient pursuit of reason and justice by constitutional means." That is just nonsense and, to be fair to Mr. Martin, he is never quite as ambitious as Lord Lothian says he is. Besides being a professional psychologist, he is an honest liberal, or rather humanist. He sees that violence is a dangerous weapon and that the appeal to violence starts a process that is difficult to control.

That needs no psychological training and can be learned from history by any intelligent reader. But when Mr. Martin comes to history itself and sets out to describe his cycles he is obviously ill-equipped historically. His reading has been cursory ; his political comprehension is limited, and his memory for facts—assuming that the statement that Thomas à Kempis was murdered in Canterbury is just a slip

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—is not so disciplined as that owned by a practising student of psychology ought to be. He has never succeeded in defining to himself—he has several definitions for the reader—either a cycle, or a revolution, or liberalism, or any of the abstract political terms which he uses. At one time the cycle is Aristotle's full circle of political evolution ; at another it is a Spenglerian cycle. A revolution is at one time change by violence ; at another change accompanied by excess ; at another any sort of change. Liberalism is perpetually confused with liberty and with humanism, and one never knows whether one is dealing with it as a party, a creed or an attitude.

It is a pity, because although one may smile at the constant intrusion of technical terms culled from the latest psychological literature and the naivété that finds in phrases like " paranoia," " crowd behaviour," " egomania " and " projection " adequate explanation of complex socio-historical problems, there is a lot in this book that makes its faults the more regrettable. There is a definite liberal faith and there is much shrewd comment on the present state of the world. The reader whose reading is limited may find profit in it. No student will.

R. T. Clark.

MOULDING MINDS

PROPAGANDA AND THE NEWS. By Will Urwin. *McGraw Hill.* 12*s.* 6*d.*

Mr. Will Urwin, who was the head of the foreign propaganda in America during the Great War, gives a brilliant account in this book of the development of press propaganda from its rudimentary beginnings in the sixteenth century to its present immensely complex state. " The world-struggle of 1914-1918," he writes, " which saw an unprecedented advance in the art of large-scale killing, saw an equally rapid advance in that of large-scale lying." Very soon after the outbreak of war, Mr. Irwin points out, propaganda, hitherto a reputable word, had come to mean " the next thing to a damned lie." Propaganda organisations, therefore, found it advisable to call themselves Departments of Counter-Propaganda, or Committees of Public Information, and other similarly reassuring names.

The English, Mr. Irwin says, were very inept propagandists at the beginning of the war. The first pamphlet, for example, sent from London to Spain tried to inflame the Spaniards against Germany by affirming that German atrocities in Belgium " exceeded the horrors of the Spanish Inquisition." The Germans, on the other hand, did not expect foreign nations to look at matters from the German standpoint. When they wished to stir Spain against the States, they circulated a story that the daughter of President Wilson had married a matador, and had, under instructions from the President, deserted her husband and the child she had borne him. The matador had been killed in the ring, his destitute parents had taken charge of the baby, and President Wilson refused to send any contributions to its support.

By the close of the war, however, English propapanda, under the direction of Northcliffe, was as efficient as German, and had the immense advantage of representing the winning side. The pamphlets dropped by English aeroplanes over the German lines, with their accounts of the good food that awaited deserters, and the willingness of President Wilson to deal gently with the Germans, as soon as they got rid of the Kaiser, were one of the most important factors in the German collapse. The Germans, too—a point not mentioned by Mr. Irwin—are very susceptible to foreign opinion, and were genuinely disturbed at being stigmatised as barbarians. They really believed that if they gave proof of a change of heart, the French and the English would be touched.

After analysing post-war propaganda with great skill, especially in Hitler's Germany, Mr. Irwin wonders whether " that poor, battered old virtue Truth " can always be

counted upon to perform " her renowned act of being crushed to earth and rising again." There is, Mr. Irwin holds, a sixth sense in the human mind, by which truth is detected. Few will dispute the existence of this sense. The trouble is that it nearly always functions in retrospect. Take, for example, the case of the Galician Jews, quoted by Mr. Irwin. During the first advance of the Germans through Poland, a leaflet was dropped from airplanes calling on General Ludendorff's " Jewish brethren " to come to Germany. They came, and it was only the accident of Ludendorff's breach with Hitler which prevented them from receiving at Ludendorff's hands the proof of his real sentiments towards the Jews. Mankind needs a seventh sense to stimulate the working of its sixth.

HUGH KINGSMILL.

THE CHARM OF AUSTRIA

AUSTRIA, LAND OF SMILES—AND TEARS. By Aimée Watt Smyth. *Burrows.* 8*s.* 6*d.*

This book is not, and is not intended to be, a guide book. Those to whom travelling is little more than a succession of cosmopolitan hotels, famous picture galleries and " monuments historiques " will not find it of very much assistance to them ; Vienna for example is deliberately not touched upon ; but to those to whom travelling means the opportunity of learning something of the real life of other peoples, their ideas and ideals, this book is an admirable introduction to that special charm and friendliness which has always been one of the chief characteristics of the Austrian people and their lovely country.

Mrs. Aimée Watt Smyth has that intimate knowledge of her subject which can only have come from long experience and thorough knowledge of the German language. She takes us through the lesser-known country districts and introduces us to her numerous friends of all types and classes, in a pleasantly discursive, almost casual, fashion and has succeeded in producing something of the essential " atmosphere " of her subject, whether it be places or people.

The very title of her book is significant ; she has taken Franz Lehar's *Das Land des Lächelns* " and has brought it up to date. No one who has travelled in Austria since the War can but agree that the addition is justified.

And here one may be permitted to regret that the intensity of the author's sympathy for her friends has led her to obtrude a political note in the latter part of her book which involves comparison with a neighbouring people to the north-west, not always quite fair to the latter ; the suggestion that Austria's downfall in 1918 was due to " Alliances with ambitious neighbours " requires considerable qualification in the light of what is now known in regard to the immediate causes of the War.

These reflections, however, may well be forgiven to one who is so obviously in love with Austria and its people. Anyone who contemplates visiting the less frequented parts of the country will get from this book just the kind of suggestions and ideas that no guide-book, however excellent, ever gives, but can only be acquired from the friend who has " been there."

KENNETH MOIR.

A TALE OF NEW RUSSIA

How an Pure-Blooded Hog Became Collective Property—and the Happiness it Brought to Popov.—*Headline in Moscow Daily News.*

THE WORLD OF FINANCE

THE CITY PREDOMINANTLY "PRO-GERMAN"

By "RAPIER"

THE uncanny calm and almost stagnation of markets in the first week of March was rudely broken by Hitler's bombshell. Not that there had not been some premonitory rumblings of trouble brewing on the Continent, but these anxieties were mainly among banking circles and did not affect stockmarket quotations which were remarkably firm. The reason for the anxieties of bankers lay in rumours that the position of Dr. Schacht, Germany's economic dictator, was again in jeopardy and that he was resisting further demands upon the German Exchequer. It is held in the City that Schacht is the only man that can save Germany from economic collapse. If such a collapse came it would threaten the security of the standstill credits and probably involve the world in fresh currency chaos. These rumours give some substantiation to the story that one reason for Hitler's offer to return to the League was the hope of thereby obtaining a foreign loan or credit to save Germany from financial collapse. Only by returning to the League was there any prospect of Germany's getting such assistance in London. If a foreign loan could be obtained it would provide an alternative solution to the dilemma posed by Mr. Winston Churchill in the House of Commons that Germany would have to choose at no distant date between an internal and an external catastrophe.

Whatever the reasons behind Hitler's action may have been, the method came as a shock to world markets. Coming as it did on a Saturday morning when Stock Exchanges are closed, or only open for a short session, its first effects were mainly felt in the foreign exchange market. The first reaction of speculators to a threatened political or economic crisis is to seek safety and liquidity for their funds. The news of the entry of German troops into the Rhineland led at once to a steady offering of French francs and purchases of dollars. Any serious depreciation of the franc was prevented by the operation of the British Exchange Equalisation Fund which absorbed all offerings and held the rate comparatively steady. It is fortunate for the French that they had successfully negotiated the £40,000,000 credit in London before this crisis occurred or otherwise the franc might have been endangered; but in any event this renewed pressure brings devaluation one step nearer.

The news caused a sharp fall in rentes and bank shares on the Paris Bourse, but before the close a good recovery set in and most of the initial losses were wiped out. The Amsterdam Bourse was unaffected having closed before the news arrived. The Vienna Bourse was fairly steady, but a wave of heavy selling was reported in the Street market after the official close. When Wall Street opened the whole story was already known and, though America is least involved in the present crisis, there was an immediate wave of selling. Later a demand sprang up for "war

stocks " such as coppers and aviation shares. A similar reaction occurred on the Canadian stock markets under the lead of Nickels. The Berlin Bourse alone of Stock Exchanges was firm and cheerful.

It was not until Monday morning that the full effects on the London markets could be judged. The City took the news with remarkable calm and though quotations were marked down as a precautionary measure there was no panic selling. For once the City seemed to be unanimous on a political situation. In their judgment, however deplorable Hitler's methods might be, it was generally agreed that the only sensible course was to take his offers at their face value and to enter into fresh negotiations for new non-aggression pacts and for the reentry of Germany into the League.

This attitude was confirmed to me by a French banker, long resident in London, who had reluctantly to admit that the City was predominantly " pro-German " in its attitude. The cynic might say that this is due to self interest and to the fact that many banking houses still have a considerable amount of their resources frozen in Germany. But I think it goes deeper than this. The general feeling seems to be that France, albeit through fear of German aggression, has not played its cards well in the post-war period, and that it is time to recognise that Germany must be readmitted to full and equal status with other nations. With business improving it is felt that these continuous political crises must be brought to an end and the peace of Europe established upon a firmer basis to allow of general world recovery. If such a consummation could be reached it might be possible to consider granting a loan to Germany which would consolidate the political regeneration. Perhaps the City is inclined to take too short views and in its anxiety to get on with its job is apt to overlook the longer term implications of Germany's threat to peace by its blatant repudiation of treaty obligations. It must also be remembered that the " off-gold " mentality of the London money market makes it much less sensitive to external influences than it was when Britain was on the gold standard. In pre-war days the London discount market rate was the most sensitive barometer in the world. In the present crisis it has hardly moved a fraction of a penny from its previous steady level.

American Prospects

Wall Street, although the focus of its attention has been temporarily diverted from Washington to Europe, is likely soon to revert its gaze to the former centre. The European crisis came at a moment when the market was due for a technical reaction and it therefore caused a heavier shakeout than seemed warranted by the circumstances. The market is all the healthier for this reaction and if business news continues as good as at present the market is likely to go ahead again. Congress is in the throes of considering the new tax proposals put before it by the President. These proposals have delighted the bulls but angered the company executives. The President proposes to repeal certain taxes and to substitute a tax on net earnings, including undistributed net earnings, which will average 33⅓ per cent. The net result of these proposals would be to give a yield of $625,000,000 which is the sum required to finance the new farm legislation and the amortisation of the soldiers' bonus. Wall Street looks for increased dividend distributions if these taxes are adopted by Congress, though its soundness as a long term proposition is dubious. If this scheme goes through those companies with strong cash positions and whose earnings are greater than their dividend distributions. appear attractive purchases.

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Doremus

Most trade indices in Britain point to a continuance of trade revival, but until the present international political crisis is resolved markets are likely to be held back and a cautious policy for investors is predicated.

WHILE POLITICIANS WRANGLE TRADERS CARRY ON

By EDUARD PLANTAGENET

From "L'Homme Libre," Paris

England has granted France a large credit ; France is negotiating the grant of one to Soviet Russia ; Germany has already proposed a bigger and better credit to her political foe—a fact on which a French writer here comments.

Nazi Germany declares itself to be the sworn foe of the Soviets, and, in a recent speech, Molotoff, President of the Council of People's Commissars, emphasised the imminence of the German peril for the U.S.S.R. But "on April 9, 1935," he added, "we signed a commercial agreement with Germany providing for a credit of 200 million marks (£10,000,000 at par) for five years. In the course of recent months the government of the Reich offered us a much more important credit than the last, repayable in ten years. Although we do not seek foreign credits systematically, we will not refuse to examine the proposition in question."

There can be no more striking example of the way in which the most ferocious political antagonisms melt away in contact with economic realities. Between 1926 and 1934 Germany received orders from the U.S.S.R. to the value of 3,075,000,000 marks (£153,750,000 at par). The sum was paid very punctually, part of it even in gold. In addition, barter agreements enable Germany to import various raw materials from Russia without loss of foreign exchange. Russia, on the other hand, finds in Germany machinery for perfecting her industrial equipment.

The long-term credits offered by Germany dispel all the Soviet Union's budgetary difficulties. The first payments for orders placed in 1935 are not due till 1941. This year the Soviet will have to pay 60,000,000 marks (£3,000,000 at par) only, in virtue of old orders. This sum is but a fraction of Russian exports to Germany. The U.S.S.R. will have a surplus. What is to be done with it ?

In 1935 the Soviet Union was in exactly the same position. It devoted the balance in its favour to cash purchase of German products in excess of the amount stipulated for in the agreements. But it is clear that that could not be a lasting solution. Hence the search for a better arrangement.

Germany argues that although she is the biggest customer of the U.S.S.R., she is only fourth on the list of suppliers. She demands more favourable treatment and suggests that trade should be carried on on the principle of reciprocity. She adds that the U.S.S.R. would be the chief beneficiary in such an arrangement, as Germany is the Soviet Union's natural and most important market, whereas the U.S.S.R. is by no means irreplaceable as a supplier for Germany. This is not altogether true. The question of supply plays an infinitely less important role than the question of the terms on which the supply may be obtained. Nowhere could Cermany find a situation equivalent to that which obtains with Russia.

However that may be, collaboration between National-Socialist Germany and the Soviet Union appears to be growing closer, whereas the opposite is true in the political field.